

Taruhan Pascal

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Blaise Pascal

Taruhan Pascal adalah gagasan yang dikeluarkan oleh [Blaise Pascal](#) bahwa jika keberadaan Tuhan tidak dapat dipercaya, seseorang harus bertaruh bahwa Tuhan itu ada, karena kita tidak akan kehilangan apapun jika kita hidup sesuai dengan perintah-Nya. Taruhan ini ada dalam karyanya, *Pensées*.

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Pascal's wager

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Blaise Pascal

Pascal's wager is a philosophical argument presented by the seventeenth-century French [philosopher](#), [theologian](#), [mathematician](#), and [physicist](#), [Blaise Pascal](#) (1623–1662).^[1] It posits that human beings [wager](#) with their lives that God either [exists](#) or does not.

Pascal argues that a rational person should live as though [God](#) exists and seek to believe in God. If God does not exist, such a person will have only a finite loss (some pleasures, luxury, etc.), whereas if God does exist, he stands to receive infinite gains (as represented by eternity in [Heaven](#)) and avoid infinite losses (an eternity in [Hell](#)).^[2]

The original wager was set out in Pascal's posthumously published *Pensées* ("Thoughts"), an assembly of previously unpublished notes.^[3] Pascal's wager charted new territory in [probability theory](#),^[4] marked the first formal use of [decision theory](#), [existentialism](#), [pragmatism](#), and [voluntarism](#).^[5]

The wager is commonly criticized with counterarguments such as the failure to prove the existence of God, the [argument from inconsistent revelations](#), and the argument from inauthentic belief.



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The wager^[edit]



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The wager uses the following logic (excerpts from *Pensées*, part III, §233):

- God is, or God is not. Reason cannot decide between the two alternatives
- A Game is being played... where heads or tails will turn up
- You must wager (it is not optional)
- Let us weigh the gain and the loss in wagering that God is. Let us estimate these two chances. If you gain, you gain all; if you lose, you lose nothing
- Wager, then, without hesitation that He is. (...) There is here an infinity of an infinitely happy life to gain, a chance of gain against a finite number of chances of loss, and what you stake is finite. And so our proposition is of infinite force when there is the finite to stake in a game where there are equal risks of gain and of loss, and the infinite to gain.
- But some cannot believe. They should then 'at least learn your inability to believe...' and 'Endeavour then to convince' themselves.

Pascal asks the reader to analyze humankind's position, where our actions can be enormously consequential, but our understanding of those consequences is flawed. While we can discern a great deal through reason, we are ultimately forced to gamble. Pascal cites a number of distinct areas of uncertainty in human life:

Category	Quotation(s)
Uncertainty in all	This is what I see, and what troubles me. I look on all sides, and everywhere I see nothing but obscurity. Nature offers me nothing that is not a matter of doubt and disquiet. ^[6]
Uncertainty in man's purpose	For after all what is man in nature? A nothing in relation to infinity, all in relation to nothing, a central point between nothing and all and infinitely far from understanding either. ^[7]
Uncertainty in reason	There is nothing so conformable to reason as this disavowal of reason. ^[8]
Uncertainty in science	There is no doubt that natural laws exist, but once this fine reason of ours was corrupted, it corrupted everything. ^[9]
Uncertainty in religion	If I saw no signs of a divinity, I would fix myself in denial. If I saw everywhere the marks of a Creator, I would repose peacefully in faith. But seeing too much to deny Him, and too little to assure me, I am in a pitiful state, and I would wish a hundred times that if a god sustains nature it would reveal Him without ambiguity. ^[6] We understand nothing of the works of God unless we take it as a principle that He wishes to blind some and to enlighten others. ^[10]
Uncertainty in skepticism	It is not certain that everything is uncertain. ^[11]

Pascal describes humanity as a finite being trapped within an incomprehensible infinity, briefly thrust into being from non-being, with no explanation of "Why?" or "What?" or "How?" On Pascal's view, human finitude constrains our ability to achieve truth reliably.

Given that reason alone cannot determine whether God exists, Pascal concludes that this question functions as a coin toss. However, even if we do not know the outcome of this coin toss, we must base our actions on some expectation about the consequence. We must decide whether to live as though God exists, or whether to live as though God does not exist, even though we may be mistaken in either case.

In Pascal's assessment, participation in this wager is not optional. Merely by existing in a state of uncertainty, we are forced to choose between the available courses of action for practical purposes.

Pascal's description of the wager^[edit]

The *Pensées* passage on Pascal's wager is as follows:

If there is a God, He is infinitely incomprehensible, since, having neither parts nor limits, He has no affinity to us. We are then incapable of knowing either what He is or if He is....

..."God is, or He is not." But to which side shall we incline? Reason can decide nothing here. There is infinite chaos that separated us. A game is being played at the extremity of this infinite distance where heads or tails will turn up. What will you wager? According to reason, you can do neither the one thing nor the other; according to reason, you can defend neither of the propositions.

Do not, then, reprove for error those who have made a choice; for you know nothing about it. "No, but I blame them for having made, not this choice, but a choice; for again both he who chooses heads and he who chooses tails are equally at fault, they are both in the wrong. The true course is not to wager at all."

Yes; but you must wager. It is not optional. You are embarked. Which will you choose then? Let us see. Since you must choose, let us see which interests you least. You have two things to lose, the true and the good; and two things to stake, your reason and your will, your knowledge and your happiness; and your nature has two things to shun, error and misery. Your reason is no more shocked in choosing one rather than the other since you must of necessity choose. This is one point settled. But your happiness? Let us weigh the gain and the loss in wagering that God is. Let us estimate these two chances. If you gain, you gain all; if you lose, you lose nothing. Wager, then, without hesitation that He is.

"That is very fine. Yes, I must wager; but I may perhaps wager too much." Let us see. Since there is an equal risk of gain and of loss, if you had only to gain two lives, instead of one, you might still wager. But if there were three lives to gain, you would have to play (since you are under the necessity of playing), and you would be imprudent, when you are forced to play, not to change your life to gain three at a game where there is an equal risk of loss and gain. But there is an eternity of life and happiness. And this being so, if there were an infinity of chances, of which one only would be for you, you would still be right in wagering one to win two, and you would act stupidly, being obliged to play, by refusing to stake one life against three at a game in which out of an infinity of chances there is one for you if there were an infinity of an infinitely happy life to gain. But there is here an infinity of an infinitely happy life to gain, a chance of gain against a finite number of chances of loss, and what you stake is finite.^[12]

Pascal begins by painting a situation where both the existence and non-existence of God are impossible to prove by [human reason](#). So, supposing that reason cannot determine the truth between the two options, one must "wager" by weighing the possible consequences. Pascal's assumption is that, when it comes to making the decision, no one can refuse to participate; withholding assent is impossible because we are already "embarked", effectively living out the choice.

We only have two things to stake, our "reason" and our "happiness". Pascal considers that if there is "equal risk of loss and gain" (i.e. a coin toss), then human reason is powerless to address the question of whether God exists. That being the case, then human reason can only decide the question according to possible resulting happiness of the decision, weighing the gain and loss in believing that God exists and likewise in believing that God does not exist.

He points out that if a wager were between the equal chance of gaining two lifetimes of happiness and gaining nothing, then a person would be a fool to bet on the latter. The same would go if it were three lifetimes of happiness versus nothing. He then argues that it is simply unconscionable by comparison to betting against an eternal life of happiness for the possibility of gaining nothing. The wise decision is to wager that God exists, since "If you gain, you gain all; if you lose, you lose nothing", meaning one can gain [eternal life](#) if God exists, but if not, one will be no worse off in death than if one had not believed. On the other hand, if you bet against God, win or lose, you either gain nothing or lose everything. You are either unavoidably annihilated (in which case, nothing matters one way or the other) or miss the opportunity of eternal happiness. In note 194, speaking about those who live apathetically betting against God, he sums up by remarking, "It is to the glory of religion to have for enemies men so unreasonable..."

Inability to believe^[edit]

Pascal addressed the difficulty that 'reason' and 'rationality' pose to genuine belief by proposing that "acting as if [one] believed" could "cure [one] of unbelief":

But at least learn your inability to believe, since reason brings you to this, and yet you cannot believe. Endeavor then to convince yourself, not by increase of proofs of God, but by the abatement of your passions. You would like to attain faith, and do not know the way; you would like to cure yourself of unbelief and ask the remedy for it. Learn of those who have been bound like you, and who now stake all their possessions. These are people who know the way which you would follow, and who

are cured of an ill of which you would be cured. Follow the way by which they began; by acting as if they believed, taking the holy water, having masses said, etc. Even this will naturally make you believe, and deaden your acuteness.^[13]

Analysis with decision theory^[edit]

The possibilities defined by Pascal's wager can be thought of as a [decision under uncertainty](#) with the values of the following [decision matrix](#).

	God exists (G)	God does not exist (\neg G)
Belief (B)	$+\infty$ (infinite gain)	$-c$ (finite loss)
Disbelief (\neg B)	$-\infty$ (infinite loss)	$+c$ (finite gain)

Given these values, the option of living as if God exists (B) dominates the option of living as if God does not exist (\neg B), as long as one assumes a positive probability that God exists. In other words, the expected value gained by choosing B is greater than or equal to that of choosing \neg B.

In fact, according to decision theory, the only value that matters in the above matrix is the $+\infty$ (infinitely positive). Any matrix of the following type (where f_1 , f_2 , and f_3 are all negative or finite positive numbers) results in (B) as being the only rational decision.^[15]

	God exists (G)	God does not exist (\neg G)
Belief (B)	$+\infty$	f_1
Disbelief (\neg B)	f_2	f_3

Misunderstanding of the wager^[edit]

Pascal's intent was not to provide an argument to convince atheists to believe, but (a) to show the fallacy of attempting to use logical arguments to prove or disprove God, and (b) to persuade atheists to sinlessness, as an aid to attaining faith ("it is this which will lessen the passions, which are your stumbling-blocks"). As Laurent Thirouin writes (note that the numbering of the items in the *Pensées* is not standardized; Thirouin's 418 is this article's 233):

The celebrity of fragment 418 has been established at the price of mutilation. By titling this text "the wager", readers have been fixated only on one part of Pascal's reasoning. It doesn't conclude with a QED at the end of the mathematical part. The unbeliever who had provoked this long analysis to counter his previous objection ("Maybe I bet too much") is still not ready to join the apologist on the side of faith. He put forward two new objections, undermining the foundations of the wager: the impossibility to know, and the obligation of playing.^[14]

To be put at the beginning of Pascal's planned book, the wager was meant to show that logical reasoning cannot support faith or lack thereof,

We have to accept reality and accept the reaction of the libertine when he rejects arguments he is unable to counter. The conclusion is evident: if men believe or refuse to believe, it is not how some believers sometimes say and most unbelievers claim because their own reason justifies the position they have adopted. Belief in God doesn't depend upon rational evidence, no matter which position.^[15]

Pascal's intended book was precisely to find other ways to establish the value of faith, an apology for the Christian faith.

Criticism^[edit]

Criticism of Pascal's wager began in his own day, and came from atheists, who questioned the "benefits" of a deity whose "realm" is beyond reason and the religiously orthodox, who primarily took issue with the wager's [deistic](#) and [agnostic](#) language. It is criticized for not proving God's existence, the encouragement of false belief, and the problem of which religion and which God should be worshipped.^{[4][16]}

Laplace^[edit]

The probabilist mathematician [Pierre Simon de Laplace](#) ridiculed the use of probability in theology. Even following Pascal's reasoning, it is not worth making a bet, for the hope of profit – equal to the product of the value of the testimonies (infinitely small) and the value of the happiness they promise (which is significant but finite) – must necessarily be infinitely small.^[17]

Failure to prove the existence of God^[edit]

[Voltaire](#) (another prominent French writer of the [Enlightenment](#)), a generation after Pascal, rejected the idea that the wager was "proof of God" as "indecent and childish", adding, "the interest I have to believe a thing is no proof that such a thing exists".^[18] Pascal, however, did not advance the wager as a proof of God's existence but rather as a necessary pragmatic decision which is "impossible to avoid" for any living person.^[19] He argued that abstaining from making a wager is not an option and that "reason is incapable of divining the truth"; thus, a decision of whether to believe in the existence of God must be made by "considering the consequences of each possibility".

Voltaire's critique concerns not the nature of the Pascalian wager as proof of God's existence, but the contention that the very belief Pascal tried to promote is not convincing. Voltaire hints at the fact that Pascal, as a [Jansenist](#), believed that only a small, and already predestined, portion of humanity would eventually be saved by God.

Voltaire explained that no matter how far someone is tempted with rewards to believe in Christian salvation, the result will be at best a faint belief.^[20] Pascal, in his *Pensées*, agrees with this, not stating that people can choose to believe (and therefore make a safe wager), but rather that some cannot believe.

As [Étienne Souriau](#) explained, in order to accept Pascal's argument, the bettor needs to be certain that God seriously intends to honour the bet; he says that the wager assumes that God also accepts the bet, which is not proved; Pascal's bettor is here like the fool who seeing a leaf floating on a river's waters and quivering at some point, for a few seconds, between the two sides of a stone, says: "I bet a million with Rothschild that it takes finally the left path." And, effectively, the leaf passed on the left side of the stone, but unfortunately for the fool Rothschild never said "I [will take that] bet".^[21]

Argument from inconsistent revelations^[edit]

Main article: [Argument from inconsistent revelations](#)

Since there have been many religions throughout history, and therefore many conceptions of God (or gods), some assert that all of them need to be factored into the wager, in an argumentation known as the argument from inconsistent revelations. This, its proponents argue, would lead to a high probability of believing in "the wrong god", which, they claim, eliminates the mathematical advantage Pascal claimed with his wager.^[4] [Denis Diderot](#), a contemporary of Voltaire, concisely expressed this opinion when asked about the wager, saying "an [Imam](#) could reason the same way".^[22] [J. L. Mackie](#) notes that "the church within which alone salvation is to be found is not necessarily the Church of Rome, but perhaps that of the [Anabaptists](#) or the [Mormons](#) or the [Muslim Sunnis](#) or the worshipers of [Kali](#) or of [Odin](#)".^[23] As just stated, the counterargument is flawed, since most religions do not say that belief in their particular god (Kali or Odin, for example) is necessary for bliss, but that flaw is easily remediable by using appropriate religions (Anabaptists vs. Roman Catholics).

Another version of this objection argues that for every religion that promulgates rules, there exists another religion that has rules of the opposite kind, e.g., Christianity requires the adherent to worship Jesus as God, but [Judaism](#) requires the adherent not to worship Jesus as God. If a certain action leads one closer to salvation in the former religion, it leads one further away from it in the latter. Therefore, the expected value of following a certain religion could be negative. Or, one could also argue that there are an infinite number of mutually exclusive religions (which is a subset of the set of all possible religions), and that the probability of any one of them being true is zero; therefore, the expected value of following a certain religion is zero.

Pascal considers this type of objection briefly in the notes compiled into the *Pensées*, and dismisses it as obviously wrong and disingenuous:^[24]

What say [the unbelievers] then? "Do we not see," say they, "that the brutes live and die like men, and Turks like Christians? They have their ceremonies, their prophets, their doctors, their saints, their monks, like us," etc. If you care but little to know the truth, that is enough to leave you in repose. But if you desire with all your heart to know it, it is not enough; look at it in detail. That would be sufficient for a question in philosophy; but not here, where everything is at stake. And yet, after a superficial reflection of this kind, we go to amuse ourselves, etc. Let us inquire of this same religion whether it does not give a reason for this obscurity; perhaps it will teach it to us.^[25]

This short but densely packed passage, which alludes to numerous themes discussed elsewhere in the *Pensées*, has given rise to many pages of scholarly analysis.

Pascal says that the skepticism of unbelievers who rest content with the many-religions objection has seduced them into a fatal "repose". If they were really bent on knowing the truth, they would be persuaded to examine "in detail" whether Christianity is like any other religion, but they just cannot be bothered.^[26] Their objection might be sufficient were the subject concerned merely some "question in philosophy", but not "here, where everything is at stake". In "a matter where they themselves, their eternity, their all are concerned",^[25] they can manage no better than "a superficial reflection" ("une reflexion légère") and, thinking they have scored a point by asking a [leading question](#), they go off to amuse themselves.^[27]

As Pascal scholars observe, Pascal regarded the many-religions objection as a rhetorical ploy, a "trap"^[28] that he had no intention of falling into. If, however, any who raised it were sincere, they would want to examine the matter "in detail". In that case, they could get some pointers by turning to his chapter on "other religions".

David Wetsel notes that Pascal's treatment of the pagan religions is brisk: "As far as Pascal is concerned, the demise of the pagan religions of antiquity speaks for itself. Those pagan religions which still exist in the New World, in [India](#), and in [Africa](#) are not even worth a second glance. They are obviously the work of superstition and ignorance and have nothing in them which might interest 'les gens habiles' ('clever men')"^[29].^[30] Islam warrants more attention, being distinguished from paganism (which for Pascal presumably includes all the other non-Christian religions) by its claim to be a revealed religion. Nevertheless, Pascal concludes that the religion founded by Mohammed can on several counts be shown to be devoid of divine authority, and that therefore, as a path to the knowledge of God, it is as much a dead end as paganism."^[31] Judaism, in view of its close links to Christianity, he deals with elsewhere.^[32]

The many-religions objection is taken more seriously by some later [apologists](#) of the wager, who argue that of the rival options only those awarding infinite happiness affect the wager's [dominance](#). In the opinion of these apologists "finite, semi-blissful promises such as Kali's or Odin's" therefore drop out of consideration.^[5] Also, the infinite bliss that the rival conception of God offers has to be mutually exclusive. If Christ's promise of bliss can be attained concurrently with [Jehovah's](#) and [Allah's](#) (all three being identified as the [God of Abraham](#)), there is no conflict in the decision matrix in the case where the cost of believing in the wrong conception of God is neutral (limbo/purgatory/spiritual death), although this would be countered with an infinite cost in the case where not believing in the correct conception of God results in punishment (hell).^[33]

[Ecumenical](#) interpretations of the wager^[34] argues that it could even be suggested that believing in a generic God, or a god by the wrong name, is acceptable so long as that conception of God has similar essential characteristics of the conception of God considered in Pascal's wager (perhaps the [God of Aristotle](#)). Proponents of this line of reasoning suggest that either all of the conceptions of God or gods throughout history truly boil down to just a small set of "genuine options", or that if Pascal's wager can simply bring a person to believe in "generic theism", it has done its job.^[33] The wager fails as an argument for believing exclusively in ecumenical religions, or believing at all in [universalist](#) religions that do not believe only their adherents attain eternal bliss.^[citation needed]

Pascal argues implicitly for the uniqueness of Christianity in the wager itself, writing: "If there is a God, He is infinitely incomprehensible...Who then can blame the Christians for not being able to give reasons for their beliefs, professing as they do a religion which they cannot explain by reason?"^[35]

Argument from inauthentic belief[\[edit\]](#)

Some critics argue that Pascal's wager, for those who cannot believe, suggests feigning belief to gain eternal reward. [Richard Dawkins](#) argues that this would be dishonest and immoral and that, in addition to this, it is absurd to think that God, being just and omniscient, would not see through this deceptive strategy on the part of the "believer", thus nullifying the benefits of the wager.^[16]

Since these criticisms are concerned not with the validity of the wager itself, but with its possible aftermath—namely that a person who has been convinced of the overwhelming odds in favor of belief might still find himself unable to sincerely believe—they are tangential to the thrust of the wager. What such critics are objecting to is Pascal's subsequent advice to an unbeliever who, having concluded that the only rational way to wager is in favor of God's existence, points out, reasonably enough, that this by no means makes him a believer. This hypothetical unbeliever complains, "I am so made that I cannot believe. What would you have me do?"^[36] Pascal, far from suggesting that God can be deceived by outward show, says that God does not regard it at all: "God looks only at what is inward."^[37] For a person who is already convinced of the odds of the wager but cannot seem to put his heart into the belief, he offers practical advice.

Explicitly addressing the question of inability to believe, Pascal argues that if the wager is valid, the inability to believe is irrational, and therefore must be caused by feelings: "your inability to believe, because reason compels you to [believe] and yet you cannot, [comes] from your passions." This inability, therefore, can be overcome by diminishing these irrational sentiments: "Learn from those who were bound like you. . . . Follow the way by which they began; by acting as if they believed, taking the holy water, having masses said, etc. Even this will naturally make you believe, and deaden your acuteness.—But this is what I am afraid of.—And why? What have you to lose?"^[38]

An uncontroversial doctrine in both Roman Catholic and Protestant theology is that mere belief in God is insufficient to attain salvation, the standard cite being [James 2:19](#): "Thou believest that there is one God; thou doest well: the devils also believe, and tremble." Salvation requires "faith" not just in the sense of belief, but of trust and obedience. Pascal and [his sister](#), a nun, were among the leaders of Roman Catholicism's [Jansenist school of thought](#) whose doctrine of salvation was close to Protestantism in emphasizing faith over works. Both Jansenists and Protestants followed [St. Augustine](#) in this emphasis (Martin Luther belonged to the [Augustinian Order](#) of monks). Augustine wrote

So our faith has to be distinguished from the faith of the demons. Our faith, you see, purifies the heart, their faith makes them guilty. They act wickedly, and so they say to the Lord, "What have you to do with us?" When you hear the demons saying this, do you imagine they don't recognize him? "We know who you are," they say. "You are the Son of God" (Lk 4:34). Peter says this and he is praised for it; 14 the demon says it, and is condemned. Why's that, if not because the words may be the same, but the heart is very different? So let us distinguish our faith, and see that believing is not enough. That's not the sort of faith that purifies the heart.^[39]

Since Pascal's position was that "saving" belief in God required more than logical assent, accepting the wager could only be a first step. Hence his advice on what steps one could take to arrive at belief.

Some other critics^[40] have objected to Pascal's wager on the grounds that he wrongly assumes what type of epistemic character God would likely value in his rational creatures if he existed.

Variations and other wager arguments[\[edit\]](#)

- The [sophist Protagoras](#) had an agnostic position regarding the gods, but he nevertheless continued to worship the gods. This could be considered as an early version of the Wager.^[40]
- In the famous tragedy of [Euripides Bacchae](#), [Kadmos](#) states an early version of Pascal's wager. It is noteworthy that at the end of the tragedy [Dionysos](#), the god to whom [Kadmos](#) referred, appears and punishes him for thinking in this way. [Euripides](#), quite clearly, considered and dismissed the wager in this tragedy.^[41]
- The [stoic philosopher](#) and [Roman Emperor Marcus Aurelius](#) expressed a similar sentiment in the second book of *Meditations*, saying "Since it is possible that thou mayest depart from life this very moment, regulate every act and thought accordingly. But to go away from among men, if there are gods, is not a thing to be afraid of, for the gods will not involve thee in evil; but if indeed they do not exist, or if they have no concern about human affairs, what is it to me to live in a universe devoid of gods or devoid of Providence?"^[42]
- In the [Sanskrit](#) classic *Sārasamuccaya*, [Vararuci](#) makes a similar argument to Pascal's wager.^[43]
- Muslim [Imam Ja'far al-Sadiq](#) is recorded to have postulated variations of the wager on several occasions in different forms, including his famed Tradition of the Myrobalan Fruit.^[44] In the [Shi'i hadith](#) book [al-Kafi](#), al-Sadiq declares to an atheist "If what you say is correct – and it is not – then we will both succeed. But if what I say is correct – and it is – then I will succeed, and you will be destroyed."^[45]
- An instantiation of this [argument](#), within the Islamic *kalam* tradition, was discussed by [Imam al-Haramayn al-Juwayni](#) (d. 478/1085) in his *Kitab al-irshad ila-qawati al-adilla fi usul al-i'tiqad*, or *A Guide to the Conclusive Proofs for the Principles of Belief*.^[46]
- The Christian apologist [Arnobius of Sicca](#) (d. 330) stated an early version of the argument in his book *Against the Pagans*, arguing "is it not more rational, of two things uncertain and hanging in doubtful suspense, rather to believe that which carries with it some hopes, than that which brings none at all?"^{[47][48]}
- A close parallel just before Pascal's time occurred in the Jesuit [Antoine Sirmond's](#) *On the Immortality of the Soul* (1635), which explicitly compared the choice of religion to playing dice and argued "However long and happy the space of this life may be, while ever you place it in the other pan of the balance against a blessed and flourishing eternity, surely it will seem to you ... that the pan will rise on high."^{[47]:30}
- The [Atheist's Wager](#), popularised by the philosopher [Michael Martin](#) and published in his 1990 book *Atheism: A Philosophical Justification*, is an atheistic wager argument in response to Pascal's wager.^[49]
- A 2008 philosophy book, *How to Make Good Decisions and Be Right All the Time*, presents a secular revision of Pascal's wager: "What does it hurt to pursue value and virtue? If there is value, then we have everything to gain, but if there is none, then we haven't lost anything.... Thus, we should seek value."^[50]
- [Roko's basilisk](#) is a hypothetical future [superintelligence](#) that punishes everyone who failed to help bring it into existence.^[51]
- In a 2014 article, philosopher Justin P. McBrayer argued we ought to remain agnostic about the existence of God but nonetheless believe because of the good that comes in the present life from believing in God. "The gist of the renewed wager is that theists do better than non-theists regardless of whether or not God exists."^[52]

Climate change[\[edit\]](#)

Since at least 1992, some scholars have analogized Pascal's wager to decisions about catastrophic climate change.^[53] Two differences from Pascal's wager are posited regarding climate change: first, climate change is more likely than Pascal's God to exist, as there is scientific evidence for one but not the other.^[54] Secondly, the calculated penalty for unchecked climate catastrophe would be large, but is not generally considered to be infinite.^[55] Magnate [Warren Buffett](#) has written that climate change "bears a similarity to Pascal's Wager on the Existence of God. Pascal, it may be recalled, argued that if there were only a tiny probability that God truly existed, it made sense to behave as if He did because the rewards could be infinite whereas the lack of belief risked eternal misery. Likewise, if there is only a 1% chance the planet is heading toward a truly major disaster and delay means passing a point of no return, inaction now is foolhardy."^[56]^[57]

See also [\[edit\]](#)

- [A Confession](#)
- [Appeal to consequences](#)
- [Argumentum ad baculum](#)
- [Atheist's Wager](#)
- [Christian existential apologetics](#)
- [Ecclesiastes](#)
- [Evil God Challenge](#)
- [Lewis's trilemma](#)
- [Four Assurances](#)
- [Buddhist wager argument for rebirth](#)
- [Pascal's mugging](#)
- [Pensées](#)

Notes [\[edit\]](#)


1. [^] [Connor, James A. \(2006\). *Pascal's wager: the man who played dice with God*. San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco. pp. 180–1. ISBN 9780060766917.](#)
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7. [^] [Pensée #72](#)
8. [^] [Pensée #272](#)
9. [^] [Pensée #294](#)
10. [^] [Pensée #565](#)
11. [^] [Pensée #387](#)
12. [^] [Pensées](#), Section III, [233](#).
13. [^] [Pensées](#) Section III note 233, Translation by W. F. Trotter
14. [^] [Laurent Thiroin, Le hasard et les règles, le modèle du jeu dans la pensée de Pascal, Vrin, Paris 1991, p.170](#)
15. [^] [Laurent Thiroin, Le hasard et les règles, le modèle du jeu dans la pensée de Pascal, Vrin, Paris 1991, p.176](#)
16. [^] [Jump up to:](#)^a [^] [Dawkins, Richard \(May 21, 2007\). "Chapter 3: Arguments for God's existence". *The God Delusion*. Black Swan. pp. 130–132. ISBN 9780552773317.](#)
17. [^] [Jacques Attali \(2004\), Pascal, Warszawa, p. 368](#)
18. [^] [Voltaire \(1728\). "Remarques \(Premières\) sur les Pensées de Pascal". *Oeuvres Complètes de Voltaire. Mélanges I \(in French\)*. Archived from the original on April 18, 2012. Retrieved April 24, 2016.](#)
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20. [^] Vous me promettez l'empire du monde si je crois que vous avez raison: je souhaite alors, de tout mon coeur, que vous ayez raison; mais jusqu'à ce que vous me l'ayez prouvé, je ne puis vous croire. [...] J'ai intérêt, sans doute, qu'il y ait un Dieu; mais si dans votre système Dieu n'est venu que pour si peu de personnes; si le petit nombre des élus est si effrayant; si je ne puis rien du tout par moi-même, dites-moi, je vous prie, quel intérêt j'ai à vous croire? N'ai-je pas un intérêt visible à être persuadé du contraire? De quel front osez-vous me montrer un bonheur infini, auquel d'un million d'hommes un seul à peine a droit d'aspirer?
21. [^] À vrai dire le célèbre pari de Pascal, ou plutôt le pari que Pascal propose au libertin n'est pas une option désintéressée mais un pari de joueur. Si le libertin joue «croix», parie que Dieu existe, il gagne (si Dieu existe) la vie éternelle et la béatitude infinie, et risque seulement de perdre les misérables plaisirs de sa vie actuelle. Cette mise ne compte pas au regard du gain possible qui est infini. Seulement, l'argument suppose que Dieu accepte le pari, que Dieu dit «je tiens». Sans quoi, nous dit Souriau, le libertin « est comme ce fou : il voit une feuille au fil de l'eau, hésiter entre deux côtés d'un caillou. Il dit : «je parie un million avec Rothschild qu'elle passera à droite». La feuille passe à droite et le fou dit : «j'ai gagné un million». Où est sa folie? Ce n'est pas que le million n'existe pas, c'est que Rothschild n'a pas dit : «je tiens». ». (Cf. l'admirable analyse du pari de Pascal in Souriau, L'ombre de Dieu, p. 47 sq.) – La Philosophie, Tome 2 (La Connaissance), [Denis Huisman](#), André Vergez, Marabout 1994, pp. 462–63
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24. [^] [Wetsel, David \(1994\). *Pascal and Disbelief: Catechesis and Conversion in the Pensées*. Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, p. 117. ISBN 0-8132-1328-2](#)
25. [^] [Jump up to:](#)^a [^] [Pensée #226](#)
26. [^] [Wetsel, Pascal and Disbelief](#), p. 370.
27. [^] [Wetsel, Pascal and Disbelief](#), p. 238.
28. [^] [Wetsel, Pascal and Disbelief](#), pp. 118 (quotation from Jean Mesnard), 236.
29. [^] [Pensée #251](#)
30. [^] [Wetsel, Pascal and Disbelief](#), p. 181.
31. [^] [Wetsel, Pascal and Disbelief](#), p. 182.
32. [^] [Wetsel, Pascal and Disbelief](#), p. 180.
33. [^] [Jump up to:](#)^a [^] [Saka, Paul. "Pascal's Wager about God". *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Retrieved April 21, 2016.](#)
34. [^] For example: [Jeff Jordan, *Gambling on God: Essays on Pascal's Wager*, 1994, Rowman & Littlefield.](#)
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External links[[edit](#)]

	Look up Pascal's wager in Wiktionary, the free dictionary.
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- [Ambiguity, Pessimism, and Rational Religious Choice \(2010\)](#) by Tigran Melkonyan and Mark Pingle, *Theory and Decision*, 2010, Volume 69, Number 3, Pages 417–438
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- [Pascal's Mugging](#) by [Nick Bostrom](#)
- [Theistic Belief and Religious Uncertainty](#) by Jeffrey Jordan

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pascal%27s_wager

Pascal's Wager: Bertaruh akan Eksistensi Tuhan

19 Januari 2010 05:10 Diperbarui: 26 Juni 2015 18:23 757 0 0

Taruhan' (wager) ini diundangkan oleh Blaise Pascal, seorang ahli matematika Perancis pada abad ke-17. Menurut Pascal, lebih baik percaya bahwa Tuhan itu ada, sebab dengan percaya maka resiko yang ditanggung akan lebih kecil. Dengan percaya akan adanya Tuhan, jikapun salah -ternyata Tuhan tidak eksis, tidak ada akhirat, tak ada surga atau neraka- maka ya sudah, toh tidak akan rugi sama sekali. Namun sebaliknya, jika sekarang terlanjur tak percaya dan ternyata Tuhan benar-benar ada, maka kemalangan yang kelak akan diterima. 'Taruhan' Pascal bisa dianalogikan dengan seseorang yang membawa payung. Jika pun tidak hujan, membawa payung tidak akan merugikan. Tapi jika hujan ternyata benar turun, maka yang membawa payung akan aman, sedang yang tidak membawa akan kuyub kebasahan. Nampaknya taruhan Pascal adalah sejenis pertarungan yang tidak akan rugi. Akan lebih aman untuk percaya daripada tidak, karena dengan tidak percaya berarti mengambil resiko teramat besar. Namun, tesis Pascal ternyata bukan tanpa kritik sama sekali. Pengkritik bukan hanya berasal dari kalangan yang 'tidak percaya', namun juga dari golongan agamawan. Berikut beberapa kritik-kritik tersebut: Pertama, kata kunci dari Pascal adalah 'percaya'. Sedang percaya bukanlah sesuatu yang dapat dikontrol. Ambil contoh legenda Tangkuban Perahu. Legenda menyatakan bahwa Gunung Tangkuban Perahu berasal dari perahu yang terbalik. Bagi orang yang tidak percaya, dia tidak akan berubah jadi percaya meskipun cerita ini diulang berkali-kali sekalipun. Ini pula yang mendasari argumen bahwa 'percaya' bukan sesuatu yang dapat diatur begitu saja. Dalam konteks kritik, seseorang bisa saja pergi ke tempat ibadah, tapi jika memang tidak percaya, maka seluruh ibadah tidak akan dilandaskan pada ketulusan. Kedua, masih berhubungan dengan 'percaya'. Pengkritik mempertanyakan, apa sih yang istimewa dari percaya? Kenapa Tuhan nampak begitu peduli dengan percaya? Bagaimana jika rasa percaya itu ternyata penuh kepura-puraan? Kenapa bukan kejujuran dan niat mencari kebenaran yang justru jadi nilai tertinggi? Deretan

pertanyaan ini bisa mewakili keberatan-keberatan di poin kedua akan status kemutlakan 'percaya' dibandingkan nilai-nilai lain. Ketiga, 'taruhan' Pascal akan nampak seperti transaksi dagang antara manusia dengan Tuhan. Tuhan akan menukar rasa percaya manusia dengan kenikmatan hari akhir. Ini akan mendorong tindakan manusia dimotifkan untuk mendapatkan imbalan, bukan sebuah pengabdian yang murni kepadaNya. Keempat, 'taruhan' Pascal tidak menjamin manusia yang percaya benar-benar aman. Bumi ini telah menjadi rumah berbagai macam agama. Setiap agama mempunyai konsep Tuhan dan kebenarannya sendiri. Sebagian besar agama juga memiliki konsep keselamatan yang eksklusif. Artinya, hanya umat seagama yang kelak akan selamat. Berbekal paradigma ini, percaya saja belum merupakan jaminan karena percaya Tuhan 'yang salah' juga akan berakhir pada petaka. Dan kenyataannya, setiap agama yakin dirinya benar sedang yang lain adalah salah. Begitulah, Pascal's Wager dan beberapa kritiknya. Corat-coret ini bukan ditujukan untuk mendorong agar jadi percaya atau tidak percaya, tapi mungkin berguna sebagai perangsang untuk merenungi apapun yang sekarang sedang kita percayai atau tidak percayai. Merenung dalam kerangka positif untuk kemudian memunculkan tindakan yang semakin baik dan arif

<https://www.kompasiana.com/shernend/54ff16cca33311d94450f825/pascal-s-wager-bertaruh-akan-eksistensi-tuhan>

ING	INA								
<p>Pascal's wager is a philosophical argument presented by the seventeenth-century French philosopher, theologian, mathematician, and physicist, Blaise Pascal (1623–1662).^[1] It posits that human beings wager with their lives that God either exists or does not.</p> <p>Pascal argues that a rational person should live as though God exists and seek to believe in God. If God does not exist, such a person will have only a finite loss (some pleasures, luxury, etc.), whereas if God does exist, he stands to receive infinite gains (as represented by eternity in Heaven) and avoid infinite losses (an eternity in Hell).^[2]</p> <p>The original wager was set out in Pascal's posthumously published Pensées ("Thoughts"), an assembly of previously unpublished notes.^[3] Pascal's wager charted new territory in probability theory,^[4] marked the first formal use of decision theory, existentialism, pragmatism, and voluntarism.^[5]</p> <p>The wager is commonly criticized with counterarguments such as the failure to prove the existence of God, the argument from inconsistent revelations, and the argument from inauthentic belief.</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/></p> <p>Contents</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1The wager • 2Pascal's description of the wager <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ 2.1Inability to believe ○ 2.2Analysis with decision theory ○ 2.3Misunderstanding of the wager • 3Criticism <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ 3.1Laplace ○ 3.2Failure to prove the existence of God ○ 3.3Argument from inconsistent revelations ○ 3.4Argument from inauthentic belief • 4Variations and other wager arguments <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ 4.1Climate change • 5See also • 6Notes • 7References • 8External links <p>The wager^[edit]</p> <p>The wager uses the following logic (excerpts from <i>Pensées</i>, part III, §233):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • God is, or God is not. Reason cannot decide between the two alternatives • A Game is being played... where heads or tails will turn up • You must wager (it is not optional) • Let us weigh the gain and the loss in wagering that God is. Let us estimate these two chances. If you gain, you gain all; if you lose, you lose nothing • Wager, then, without hesitation that He is. (...) There is here an infinity of an infinitely happy life to gain, a chance of gain against a finite number of chances of loss, and what you stake is finite. And so our proposition is of infinite force when there is the finite to stake in a game where there are equal risks of gain and of loss, and the infinite to gain. • But some cannot believe. They should then 'at least learn your inability to believe...' and 'Endeavour then to convince' themselves. <p>Pascal asks the reader to analyze humankind's position, where our actions can be enormously consequential, but our understanding of those consequences is flawed. While we can discern a great deal through reason, we are ultimately forced to gamble. Pascal cites a number of distinct areas of uncertainty in human life:</p> <table border="1" data-bbox="76 1749 762 2136"> <thead> <tr> <th>Category</th> <th>Quotation(s)</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Uncertainty in all</td> <td>This is what I see, and what troubles me. I look on all sides, and everywhere I see nothing but obscurity. Nature offers me nothing that is not a matter of doubt and disquiet.^[6]</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Uncertainty in man's purpose</td> <td>For after all what is man in nature? A nothing in relation to infinity, all in relation to nothing, a central point between nothing and all and infinitely far from understanding either.^[7]</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Uncertainty in reason</td> <td>There is nothing so conformable</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	Category	Quotation(s)	Uncertainty in all	This is what I see, and what troubles me. I look on all sides, and everywhere I see nothing but obscurity. Nature offers me nothing that is not a matter of doubt and disquiet. ^[6]	Uncertainty in man's purpose	For after all what is man in nature? A nothing in relation to infinity, all in relation to nothing, a central point between nothing and all and infinitely far from understanding either. ^[7]	Uncertainty in reason	There is nothing so conformable	<p>Taruhan Pascal adalah argumen filosofis yang disajikan oleh filsuf, teolog, matematikawan, dan fisikawan Prancis abad ketujuh belas, Blaise Pascal (1623-1662).^[1] Ini mengandaikan bahwa manusia bertaruh dengan hidup mereka bahwa Tuhan ada atau tidak.</p> <p>Pascal berpendapat bahwa orang yang rasional harus hidup seolah-olah Tuhan ada dan berusaha untuk percaya pada Tuhan. Jika Tuhan tidak ada, orang seperti itu hanya akan mengalami kerugian yang terbatas (beberapa kesenangan, kemewahan, dll.), sedangkan jika Tuhan memang ada, ia berdiri untuk menerima keuntungan yang tidak terbatas (seperti yang diwakili oleh kekekalan di Surga) dan menghindari kerugian yang tidak terbatas (keabadian di Neraka).^[2]</p> <p>Taruhan asli ditetapkan dalam <i>Pensées</i> ("Pemikiran") Pascal yang diterbitkan secara anumerta, kumpulan catatan yang sebelumnya tidak diterbitkan.^[3] Taruhan Pascal memetakan wilayah baru dalam teori probabilitas, ^[4] menandai penggunaan formal pertama dari teori keputusan, eksistensialisme, pragmatisme, dan voluntarisme.</p> <p>Taruhan ini biasanya dikritik dengan argumen tandingan seperti kegagalan membuktikan keberadaan Tuhan, argumen dari wahyu yang tidak konsisten, dan argumen dari keyakinan yang tidak autentik.</p> <p>Isi</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1Taruhan • Deskripsi 2Pascal tentang taruhan <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ 2.1 Ketidakmampuan untuk percaya ○ 2.2 Analisis dengan teori keputusan ○ 2.3 Kesalahpahaman tentang taruhan • 3Kritik <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ 3.1 Laplace ○ 3.2 Kegagalan untuk membuktikan keberadaan Tuhan ○ 3.3 Argumen dari wahyu yang tidak konsisten ○ 3.4 Argumen dari keyakinan yang tidak autentik • 4Variasi dan argumen taruhan lainnya <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ 4.1 Perubahan iklim • 5Lihat juga • 6Catatan • 7Referensi • 8Tautan eksternal <p>Taruhan^[sunting sunting sumber]</p> <p>Bagian ini membutuhkan kutipan tambahan untuk verifikasi. Harap membantu meningkatkan artikel ini dengan menambahkan kutipan ke sumber terpercaya. Materi yang tidak bersumber dapat ditantang dan dihapus. (Juni 2021) (Pelajari cara dan kapan menghapus pesan templat ini)</p> <p>Taruhan menggunakan logika berikut (kutipan dari <i>Pensées</i>, bagian III, 233):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tuhan ada, atau Tuhan tidak. Alasan tidak dapat memutuskan antara dua alternatif • Sebuah Game sedang dimainkan... dimana kepala atau ekor akan muncul • Anda harus bertaruh (tidak opsional) • Mari kita timbang untung dan kerugian dalam bertaruh bahwa Tuhan itu ada. Mari kita perkirakan dua peluang ini. Jika Anda mendapatkan, Anda mendapatkan semua; jika kamu kalah, kamu tidak akan kehilangan apa-apa • Bertaruh, kemudian, tanpa ragu-ragu bahwa Dia ada. (...) Di sini ada kehidupan tak terbatas yang bahagia untuk diperoleh, peluang untung melawan sejumlah peluang kerugian yang terbatas, dan apa yang Anda pertaruhkan terbatas. Jadi proposisi kami adalah kekuatan tak terbatas ketika ada yang terbatas untuk dipertaruhkan dalam permainan di mana ada risiko keuntungan dan kerugian yang sama, dan keuntungan tak terbatas. • Tetapi beberapa tidak percaya. Mereka kemudian harus 'setidaknya mempelajari ketidakmampuan Anda untuk percaya ...' dan 'Berusaha kemudian untuk meyakinkan' diri mereka sendiri. <p>Pascal meminta pembaca untuk menganalisis posisi umat manusia, di mana tindakan kita bisa sangat berdampak, tetapi pemahaman kita tentang konsekuensi itu cacat. Meskipun kita dapat membedakan banyak hal melalui akal, kita pada akhirnya dipaksa untuk berjudi. Pascal mengutip sejumlah bidang ketidakpastian yang berbeda dalam kehidupan manusia:</p> <p>Kutipan Kategori</p> <p>Ketidakpastian dalam semua Ini adalah apa yang saya lihat, dan apa yang mengganggu saya. Saya melihat ke semua sisi, dan di mana-mana saya tidak melihat apa pun kecuali ketidakjelasan. Alam tidak memberi saya apa pun yang bukan masalah keraguan dan kegelisahan.^[6]</p> <p>Ketidakpastian dalam tujuan manusia Lagi pula, apakah manusia di alam? Tidak ada apa-apa dalam kaitannya dengan ketidakterbatasan, semua dalam hubungan dengan ketiadaan, titik sentral antara tidak ada dan semua dan juga jauh dari pemahaman.^[7]</p> <p>Ketidakpastian dalam nalar Tidak ada yang begitu sesuai dengan nalar selain penolakan nalar ini.^[8]</p> <p>Ketidakpastian dalam sains Tidak ada keraguan bahwa hukum alam ada, tetapi begitu alasan kita yang bagus ini rusak, itu merusak segalanya.^[9]</p>
Category	Quotation(s)								
Uncertainty in all	This is what I see, and what troubles me. I look on all sides, and everywhere I see nothing but obscurity. Nature offers me nothing that is not a matter of doubt and disquiet. ^[6]								
Uncertainty in man's purpose	For after all what is man in nature? A nothing in relation to infinity, all in relation to nothing, a central point between nothing and all and infinitely far from understanding either. ^[7]								
Uncertainty in reason	There is nothing so conformable								

	to reason as this disavowal of reason. ^[8]	Ketidakpastian dalam agama Jika saya tidak melihat tanda-tanda ketuhanan, saya akan memperbaiki diri dalam penyangkalan. Jika saya melihat di mana-mana tanda-tanda Pencipta, saya akan beristirahat dengan damai dalam iman. Tetapi melihat terlalu banyak untuk menyangkal Dia, dan terlalu sedikit untuk meyakinkan saya, saya berada dalam keadaan yang menyedihkan, dan saya akan berharap seratus kali bahwa jika dewa menopang alam itu akan mengungkapkannya Dia tanpa ambiguitas. Kita tidak memahami apa pun tentang pekerjaan Tuhan kecuali kita menganggapnya sebagai prinsip bahwa Dia ingin membutkan beberapa orang dan mencerahkan yang lain.[10]
Uncertainty in science	There is no doubt that natural laws exist, but once this fine reason of ours was corrupted, it corrupted everything. ^[9]	Ketidakpastian dalam skeptisisme Tidak pasti bahwa segala sesuatu tidak pasti.[11]
Uncertainty in religion	If I saw no signs of a divinity, I would fix myself in denial. If I saw everywhere the marks of a Creator, I would repose peacefully in faith. But seeing too much to deny Him, and too little to assure me, I am in a pitiful state, and I would wish a hundred times that if a god sustains nature it would reveal Him without ambiguity. ^[6] We understand nothing of the works of God unless we take it as a principle that He wishes to blind some and to enlighten others. ^[10]	Pascal menggambarkan manusia sebagai makhluk terbatas yang terperangkap dalam ketidakbatasan yang tidak dapat dipahami, secara singkat didorong menjadi ada dari non-ada, tanpa penjelasan tentang "Mengapa?" atau apa?" atau bagaimana?" Dalam pandangan Pascal, keterbatasan manusia membatasi kemampuan kita untuk mencapai kebenaran dengan andal. Mengingat alasan itu saja tidak dapat menentukan apakah Tuhan itu ada, Pascal menyimpulkan bahwa pertanyaan ini berfungsi sebagai lemparan koin. Namun, bahkan jika kita tidak mengetahui hasil dari lemparan koin ini, kita harus mendasarkan tindakan kita pada beberapa ekspektasi tentang konsekuensinya. Kita harus memutuskan apakah akan hidup seolah-olah Tuhan ada, atau apakah hidup seolah-olah Tuhan tidak ada, meskipun kita mungkin salah dalam kedua kasus tersebut.
Uncertainty in skepticism	It is not certain that everything is uncertain. ^[11]	Dalam penilaian Pascal, partisipasi dalam taruhan ini tidak opsional. Hanya dengan berada dalam keadaan tidak pasti, kita dipaksa untuk memilih antara tindakan yang tersedia untuk tujuan praktis. Deskripsi Pascal tentang taruhan[sunting sunting sumber] Bagian <i>Pensées</i> pada taruhan Pascal adalah sebagai berikut: Jika ada Tuhan, Dia tidak dapat dipahami tanpa batas, karena, tidak memiliki bagian atau batas, Dia tidak memiliki kedekatan dengan kita. Kita kemudian tidak mampu mengetahui apakah Dia itu atau apakah Dia.... ..."Tuhan ada, atau tidak." Tapi ke sisi mana kita akan condong? Alasan tidak dapat memutuskan apa pun di sini. Ada kekacauan tak terbatas yang memisahkan kami. Sebuah permainan sedang dimainkan di ujung jarak yang tak terbatas ini di mana kepala atau ekor akan muncul. Apa yang akan Anda pertaruhkan? Menurut alasan, Anda tidak dapat melakukan satu hal atau yang lain; menurut alasan, Anda tidak dapat mempertahankan salah satu dari proposisi. Maka janganlah menegur karena kesalahan mereka yang telah membuat pilihan; karena kamu tidak tahu apa-apa tentang itu. "Tidak, tapi saya menyalahkan mereka karena telah membuat, bukan pilihan ini, tetapi pilihan; karena sekali lagi dia yang memilih kepala dan dia yang memilih ekor sama-sama bersalah, mereka berdua salah. Jalan yang benar bukanlah bertaruh sama sekali." Ya; tetapi Anda harus bertaruh. Hal ini tidak opsional. Anda berangkat. Mana yang akan kamu pilih nanti? Mari kita lihat. Karena Anda harus memilih, mari kita lihat mana yang paling tidak Anda minati. Anda kehilangan dua hal, yang benar dan yang baik; dan dua hal untuk dipertaruhkan, alasan dan kehendak Anda, pengetahuan Anda dan kebahagiaan Anda; dan sifatmu memiliki dua hal yang harus dihindari, kesalahan dan kesengsaraan. Alasan Anda tidak lebih terkejut dalam memilih satu daripada yang lain karena Anda harus memilih. Ini adalah satu poin yang diselesaikan. Tapi kebahagiaanmu? Mari kita timbang untung dan ruginya dalam bertaruh bahwa Tuhan itu ada. Mari kita perkirakan dua peluang ini. Jika Anda mendapatkan, Anda mendapatkan semua; jika Anda kalah, Anda tidak akan kehilangan apa-apa. Taruhan, kemudian, tanpa ragu-ragu bahwa Dia ada. "Itu bagus sekali. Ya, saya harus bertaruh; tapi saya mungkin bertaruh terlalu banyak." Mari kita lihat. Karena ada risiko untung dan rugi yang sama, jika Anda hanya mendapatkan dua nyawa, alih-alih satu, Anda mungkin masih bertaruh. Tetapi jika ada tiga kehidupan untuk diperoleh, Anda harus bermain (karena Anda berada di bawah kebutuhan untuk bermain), dan Anda akan tidak bijaksana, ketika Anda dipaksa untuk bermain, untuk tidak mengubah hidup Anda untuk mendapatkan tiga pada permainan di mana ada risiko kerugian dan keuntungan yang sama. Tapi ada keabadian hidup dan kebahagiaan. Dan dengan demikian, jika ada peluang tak terbatas, yang hanya satu untuk Anda, Anda masih berhak bertaruh satu untuk memenangkan dua, dan Anda akan bertindak bodoh, diwajibkan untuk bermain, dengan menolak untuk mempertaruhkan satu. hidup melawan tiga di permainan di mana dari tak terhingga peluang ada satu untuk Anda jika ada tak terhingga dari kehidupan bahagia tak terbatas untuk mendapatkan. Tetapi di sini ada kehidupan tak terbatas yang bahagia untuk diperoleh, peluang untung melawan sejumlah peluang kerugian yang terbatas, dan apa yang Anda pertaruhkan terbatas.[12]

Pascal describes humanity as a finite being trapped within an incomprehensible infinity, briefly thrust into being from non-being, with no explanation of "Why?" or "What?" or "How?" On Pascal's view, human finitude constrains our ability to achieve truth reliably.

Given that reason alone cannot determine whether God exists, Pascal concludes that this question functions as a coin toss. However, even if we do not know the outcome of this coin toss, we must base our actions on some expectation about the consequence. We must decide whether to live as though God exists, or whether to live as though God does not exist, even though we may be mistaken in either case.

In Pascal's assessment, participation in this wager is not optional. Merely by existing in a state of uncertainty, we are forced to choose between the available courses of action for practical purposes.

Pascal's description of the wager[[edit](#)]

The *Pensées* passage on Pascal's wager is as follows:

If there is a God, He is infinitely incomprehensible, since, having neither parts nor limits, He has no affinity to us. We are then incapable of knowing either what He is or if He is....

..."God is, or He is not." But to which side shall we incline? Reason can decide nothing here. There is infinite chaos that separated us. A game is being played at the extremity of this infinite distance where heads or tails will turn up. What will you wager? According to reason, you can do neither the one thing nor the other; according to reason, you can defend neither of the propositions.

Do not, then, reprove for error those who have made a choice; for you know nothing about it. "No, but I blame them for having made, not this choice, but a choice; for again both he who chooses heads and he who chooses tails are equally at fault, they are both in the wrong. The true course is not to wager at all."

Yes; but you must wager. It is not optional. You are embarked. Which will you choose then? Let us see. Since you must choose, let us see which interests you least. You have two things to lose, the true and the good; and two things to stake, your reason and your will, your knowledge and your happiness; and your nature has two things to shun, error and misery. Your reason is no more shocked in choosing one rather than the other since you must of necessity choose. This is one point settled. But your happiness? Let us weigh the gain and the loss in wagering that God is. Let us estimate these two chances. If you gain, you gain all; if you lose, you lose nothing. Wager, then, without hesitation that He is.

"That is very fine. Yes, I must wager; but I may perhaps wager too much." Let us see. Since there is an equal risk of gain and of loss, if you had only to gain two lives, instead of one, you might still wager. But if there were three lives to gain, you would have to play (since you are under the necessity of playing), and you would be imprudent, when you are forced to play, not to change your life to gain three at a game where there is an equal risk of loss and gain. But there is an eternity of life and happiness. And this being so, if there were an infinity of chances, of which one only would be for you, you would still be right in wagering one to win two, and you would act stupidly, being obliged to play, by refusing to stake one life against three at a game in which out of an infinity of chances there is one for you if there were an infinity of an infinitely happy life to gain. But there is here an infinity of an infinitely happy life to gain, a chance of gain against a finite number of chances of loss, and what you stake is finite.^[12]

Pascal begins by painting a situation where both the existence and non-existence of God are impossible to prove by [human reason](#). So, supposing that reason cannot determine the truth between the two options, one must "wager" by weighing the possible consequences. Pascal's assumption is that, when it comes to making the decision, no one can refuse to participate; withholding assent is impossible because we are already "embarked", effectively living out

the choice.

We only have two things to stake, our "reason" and our "happiness". Pascal considers that if there is "equal risk of loss and gain" (i.e. a coin toss), then human reason is powerless to address the question of whether God exists. That being the case, then human reason can only decide the question according to possible resulting happiness of the decision, weighing the gain and loss in believing that God exists and likewise in believing that God does not exist.

He points out that if a wager were between the equal chance of gaining two lifetimes of happiness and gaining nothing, then a person would be a fool to bet on the latter. The same would go if it were three lifetimes of happiness versus nothing. He then argues that it is simply unconscionable by comparison to betting against an eternal life of happiness for the possibility of gaining nothing. The wise decision is to wager that God exists, since "If you gain, you gain all; if you lose, you lose nothing", meaning one can gain [eternal life](#) if God exists, but if not, one will be no worse off in death than if one had not believed. On the other hand, if you bet against God, win or lose, you either gain nothing or lose everything. You are either unavoidably annihilated (in which case, nothing matters one way or the other) or miss the opportunity of eternal happiness. In note 194, speaking about those who live apathetically betting against God, he sums up by remarking, "It is to the glory of religion to have for enemies men so unreasonable..."

Inability to believe^[edit]

Pascal addressed the difficulty that 'reason' and 'rationality' pose to genuine belief by proposing that "acting as if [one] believed" could "cure [one] of unbelief":

But at least learn your inability to believe, since reason brings you to this, and yet you cannot believe. Endeavor then to convince yourself, not by increase of proofs of God, but by the abatement of your passions. You would like to attain faith, and do not know the way; you would like to cure yourself of unbelief and ask the remedy for it. Learn of those who have been bound like you, and who now stake all their possessions. These are people who know the way which you would follow, and who are cured of an ill of which you would be cured. Follow the way by which they began; by acting as if they believed, taking the holy water, having masses said, etc. Even this will naturally make you believe, and deaden your acuteness.^[13]

Analysis with decision theory^[edit]

The possibilities defined by Pascal's wager can be thought of as a [decision under uncertainty](#) with the values of the following [decision matrix](#).

	God exists (G)	God does not exist (¬G)
Belief (B)	$+\infty$ (infinite gain)	$-c$ (finite loss)
Disbelief (¬B)	$-\infty$ (infinite loss)	$+c$ (finite gain)

Given these values, the option of living as if God exists (B) dominates the option of living as if God does not exist (¬B), as long as one assumes a positive probability that God exists. In other words, the expected value gained by choosing B is greater than or equal to that of choosing ¬B.

In fact, according to decision theory, the only value that matters in the above matrix is the $+\infty$ (infinitely positive). Any matrix of the following type (where f_1 , f_2 , and f_3 are all negative or finite positive numbers) results in (B) as being the only rational decision.^[15]

	God exists (G)	God does not exist (¬G)
Belief (B)	$+\infty$	f_1
Disbelief (¬B)	f_2	f_3

Misunderstanding of the wager^[edit]

Pascal's intent was not to provide an argument to convince atheists to believe, but (a) to show the fallacy of attempting to use logical arguments to prove or disprove God, and (b) to persuade atheists to sinlessness, as an aid to attaining faith ("it is this which will lessen the passions, which are your stumbling-blocks"). As Laurent Thirouin writes (note that the numbering of the items in the *Pensees* is not standardized; Thirouin's 418 is this article's 233):

The celebrity of fragment 418 has been established at the price of mutilation. By titling this text "the wager", readers have been fixated only on one part of Pascal's reasoning. It doesn't conclude with a QED at the end of the mathematical part. The unbeliever who had provoked this long analysis to counter his previous objection ("Maybe I bet too much") is still not ready to join the apologist on the side of faith. He put forward two new objections, undermining the foundations of the wager: the impossibility to know, and the obligation of playing.^[14]

To be put at the beginning of Pascal's planned book, the wager was meant to show that logical reasoning cannot support faith or lack thereof.

We have to accept reality and accept the reaction of the libertine when he rejects arguments he is unable to counter. The conclusion is evident: if men believe or refuse to believe, it is not how some believers sometimes say and most unbelievers claim because their own reason justifies the position they have adopted. Belief in God doesn't depend upon rational evidence, no matter which position.^[15]

Pascal's intended book was precisely to find other ways to establish the value of faith, an apology for the Christian faith.

Criticism^[edit]

dari keputusan tersebut, menimbang untung ruginya percaya bahwa Tuhan itu ada dan juga dalam percaya bahwa Tuhan itu tidak ada.

Dia menunjukkan bahwa jika taruhan berada di antara peluang yang sama untuk mendapatkan dua kehidupan kebahagiaan dan tidak mendapatkan apa-apa, maka seseorang akan menjadi bodoh untuk bertaruh pada yang terakhir. Hal yang sama akan terjadi jika itu adalah tiga kehidupan kebahagiaan versus tidak sama sekali. Dia kemudian berpendapat bahwa itu tidak masuk akal dibandingkan dengan bertaruh melawan kehidupan kebahagiaan abadi untuk kemungkinan mendapatkan apa-apa. Keputusan bijak adalah bertaruh bahwa Tuhan itu ada, karena "Jika Anda mendapatkan, Anda mendapatkan semua; jika Anda kalah, Anda tidak kehilangan apa-apa", yang berarti seseorang dapat memperoleh kehidupan abadi jika Tuhan ada, tetapi jika tidak, seseorang tidak akan lebih buruk dalam kematian daripada jika seseorang tidak percaya. Di sisi lain, jika Anda bertaruh melawan Tuhan, menang atau kalah, Anda tidak mendapatkan apa-apa atau kehilangan segalanya. Anda tidak dapat dihindarkan dimusnahkan (dalam hal ini, tidak ada yang penting dengan satu atau lain cara) atau kehilangan kesempatan kebahagiaan abadi. Dalam catatan 194, berbicara tentang mereka yang hidup dengan apatis bertaruh melawan Tuhan, ia menyimpulkan dengan berkomentar, "Adalah untuk kemuliaan agama memiliki musuh manusia yang begitu tidak masuk akal..."

Ketidakmampuan untuk percaya^[sunting | sunting sumber]

Pascal membahas kesulitan yang ditimbulkan oleh 'akal' dan 'rasionalitas' pada keyakinan sejati dengan mengusulkan bahwa "bertindak seolah-olah [satu] percaya" dapat "menyembuhkan [satu] ketidakpercayaan":

Tapi setidaknya pelajari ketidakmampuan Anda untuk percaya, karena alasan membawa Anda ke sini, namun Anda tidak bisa percaya. Berusahalah untuk meyakinkan diri Anda sendiri, bukan dengan memperbanyak bukti-bukti dari Tuhan, tetapi dengan mengurangi nafsu Anda. Anda ingin mencapai keyakinan, dan tidak tahu jalan; Anda ingin menyembuhkan diri sendiri dari ketidakpercayaan dan meminta obatnya. Pelajari tentang mereka yang telah terikat seperti Anda, dan yang sekarang mempertaruhkan semua milik mereka. Mereka itulah orang-orang yang mengetahui jalan yang akan kamu ikuti, dan orang-orang yang disembuhkan dari penyakit yang dengannya kamu akan disembuhkan. Ikuti cara mereka memulai; dengan bertindak seolah-olah mereka percaya, mengambil air suci, mengadakan misa, dll. Bahkan ini secara alami akan membuat Anda percaya, dan mematikan ketajaman Anda.^[13]

Analisis dengan teori keputusan^[sunting | sunting sumber]

Kemungkinan yang ditentukan oleh taruhan Pascal dapat dianggap sebagai keputusan di bawah ketidakpastian dengan nilai matriks keputusan berikut.

Tuhan ada (G) Tuhan tidak ada (¬G)

Keyakinan (B) $+\infty$ (keuntungan tak terbatas) c (kerugian tak terbatas)

Ketidakpercayaan (¬B) (kerugian tak terbatas) $+c$ (keuntungan terbatas)

Mengingat nilai-nilai ini, pilihan hidup seolah-olah Tuhan ada (B) mendominasi pilihan hidup seolah-olah Tuhan tidak ada (¬B), selama seseorang mengasumsikan probabilitas positif bahwa Tuhan ada. Dengan kata lain, nilai harapan yang diperoleh dengan memilih B lebih besar dari atau sama dengan memilih B.

Faktanya, menurut teori keputusan, satu-satunya nilai yang penting dalam matriks di atas adalah $+\infty$ (positif tak terhingga). Matriks apa pun dari jenis berikut (di mana f_1 , f_2 , dan f_3 semuanya negatif atau bilangan positif berhingga) menghasilkan (B) sebagai satu-satunya keputusan rasional.^[5]

Tuhan ada (G) Tuhan tidak ada (¬G)

Keyakinan (B) $+\infty$ f_1

Ketidakpercayaan (¬B) f_2 f_3

Kesalahpahaman tentang taruhan^[sunting | sunting sumber]

Maksud Pascal bukanlah untuk memberikan argumen untuk meyakinkan ateis untuk percaya, tetapi (a) untuk menunjukkan kesalahan dalam mencoba menggunakan argumen logis untuk membuktikan atau menyangkal Tuhan, dan (b) untuk membujuk ateis agar tidak berdosa, sebagai bantuan untuk mencapai iman ("Inilah yang akan mengurangi nafsu, yang menjadi batu sandungan Anda"). Seperti yang ditulis Laurent Thirouin (perhatikan bahwa penomoran item dalam *Pensees* tidak distandarisasi; 418 Thirouin adalah 233) artikel ini:

Selebriti fragmen 418 telah ditetapkan dengan harga mutilasi. Dengan memberi judul teks ini "taruhan", pembaca hanya terpaku pada satu bagian dari alasan Pascal. Itu tidak diakhiri dengan QED di akhir bagian matematika. Orang tidak percaya yang telah memprovokasi analisis panjang ini untuk melawan keberatannya sebelumnya ("Mungkin saya terlalu banyak bertaruh") masih belum siap untuk bergabung dengan pembela di sisi iman. Dia mengajukan dua keberatan baru, merusak fondasi taruhan: ketidakmungkinan untuk mengetahui, dan kewajiban bermain.^[14]

Untuk ditempatkan di awal buku rencana Pascal, taruhan dimaksudkan untuk menunjukkan bahwa penalaran logis tidak dapat mendukung keyakinan atau ketiadaannya.

Kita harus menerima kenyataan dan menerima reaksi libertine ketika dia menolak argumen yang tidak bisa dia lawan. Kesimpulannya jelas: jika orang percaya atau menolak untuk percaya, itu bukanlah bagaimana beberapa orang percaya kadang-kadang mengatakan dan kebanyakan orang tidak percaya mengklaim karena alasan mereka sendiri membenarkan posisi yang mereka ambil. Percaya kepada Tuhan tidak bergantung pada bukti rasional, apapun posisinya.^[15]

Buku Pascal yang dimaksudkan justru untuk menemukan cara lain untuk menegakkan nilai iman, sebuah permintaan maaf untuk iman Kristen.

Kritik^[sunting | sunting sumber]

Kritik terhadap taruhan Pascal dimulai pada zamannya sendiri, dan datang dari para ateis, yang mempertanyakan "manfaat" dewa yang "wilayahnya" berada di luar

Criticism of Pascal's wager began in his own day, and came from atheists, who questioned the "benefits" of a deity whose "realm" is beyond reason and the religiously orthodox, who primarily took issue with the wager's [deistic](#) and [agnostic](#) language. It is criticized for not proving God's existence, the encouragement of false belief, and the problem of which religion and which God should be worshipped.^{[41][46]}

Laplace[[edit](#)]

The probabilist mathematician [Pierre Simon de Laplace](#) ridiculed the use of probability in theology. Even following Pascal's reasoning, it is not worth making a bet, for the hope of profit – equal to the product of the value of the testimonies (infinitely small) and the value of the happiness they promise (which is significant but finite) – must necessarily be infinitely small.^[47]

Failure to prove the existence of God[[edit](#)]

[Voltaire](#) (another prominent French writer of the [Enlightenment](#)), a generation after Pascal, rejected the idea that the wager was "proof of God" as "indecent and childish", adding, "the interest I have to believe a thing is no proof that such a thing exists".^[48] Pascal, however, did not advance the wager as a proof of God's existence but rather as a necessary pragmatic decision which is "impossible to avoid" for any living person.^[49] He argued that abstaining from making a wager is not an option and that "reason is incapable of divining the truth"; thus, a decision of whether to believe in the existence of God must be made by "considering the consequences of each possibility".

Voltaire's critique concerns not the nature of the Pascalian wager as proof of God's existence, but the contention that the very belief Pascal tried to promote is not convincing. Voltaire hints at the fact that Pascal, as a [Jansenist](#), believed that only a small, and already predestined, portion of humanity would eventually be saved by God.

Voltaire explained that no matter how far someone is tempted with rewards to believe in Christian salvation, the result will be at best a faint belief.^[20] Pascal, in his *Pensées*, agrees with this, not stating that people can choose to believe (and therefore make a safe wager), but rather that some cannot believe.

As [Étienne Souriau](#) explained, in order to accept Pascal's argument, the bettor needs to be certain that God seriously intends to honour the bet; he says that the wager assumes that God also accepts the bet, which is not proved; Pascal's bettor is here like the fool who seeing a leaf floating on a river's waters and quivering at some point, for a few seconds, between the two sides of a stone, says: "I bet a million with Rothschild that it takes finally the left path." And, effectively, the leaf passed on the left side of the stone, but unfortunately for the fool Rothschild never said "I [will take that] bet".^[21]

Argument from inconsistent revelations[[edit](#)]

Main article: [Argument from inconsistent revelations](#)

Since there have been many religions throughout history, and therefore many conceptions of God (or gods), some assert that all of them need to be factored into the wager, in an argumentation known as the argument from inconsistent revelations. This, its proponents argue, would lead to a high probability of believing in "the wrong god", which, they claim, eliminates the mathematical advantage Pascal claimed with his wager.^[4] [Denis Diderot](#), a contemporary of Voltaire, concisely expressed this opinion when asked about the wager, saying "an [Imam](#) could reason the same way".^[22] [J. L. Mackie](#) notes that "the church within which alone salvation is to be found is not necessarily the Church of Rome, but perhaps that of the [Anabaptists](#) or the [Mormons](#) or the [Muslim Sunnis](#) or the worshippers of [Kali](#) or of [Odin](#)."^[23] As just stated, the counterargument is flawed, since most religions do not say that belief in their particular god (Kali or Odin, for example) is necessary for bliss, but that flaw is easily remediable by using appropriate religions (Anabaptists vs. Roman Catholics).

Another version of this objection argues that for every religion that promulgates rules, there exists another religion that has rules of the opposite kind, e.g., Christianity requires the adherent to worship Jesus as God, but [Judaism](#) requires the adherent not to worship Jesus as God. If a certain action leads one closer to salvation in the former religion, it leads one further away from it in the latter. Therefore, the expected value of following a certain religion could be negative. Or, one could also argue that there are an infinite number of mutually exclusive religions (which is a subset of the set of all possible religions), and that the probability of any one of them being true is zero; therefore, the expected value of following a certain religion is zero.

Pascal considers this type of objection briefly in the notes compiled into the *Pensées*, and dismisses it as obviously wrong and disingenuous.^[24]

What say [the unbelievers] then? "Do we not see," say they, "that the brutes live and die like men, and Turks like Christians? They have their ceremonies, their prophets, their doctors, their saints, their monks, like us," etc. If you care but little to know the truth, that is enough to leave you in repose. But if you desire with all your heart to know it, it is not enough; look at it in detail. That would be sufficient for a question in philosophy; but not here, where everything is at stake. And yet, after a superficial reflection of this kind, we go to amuse ourselves, etc. Let us inquire of this same religion whether it does not give a reason for this obscurity; perhaps it will teach it to us.^[25]

This short but densely packed passage, which alludes to numerous themes discussed elsewhere in the *Pensées*, has given rise to many pages of scholarly analysis.

Pascal says that the skepticism of unbelievers who rest content with the many-religions objection has seduced them into a fatal "repose". If they were really

nalar dan ortodoks agama, yang terutama memperlakukan bahasa deistik dan agnostik taruhan. Dikritik karena tidak membuktikan keberadaan Tuhan, dorongan kepercayaan yang salah, dan masalah agama mana dan Tuhan mana yang harus disembah.[4][16]

Laplace[sunting | sunting sumber]

Ahli matematika probabilitas Pierre Simon de Laplace mengolok-olok penggunaan probabilitas dalam teologi. Bahkan mengikuti alasan Pascal, tidak layak bertaruh, karena harapan keuntungan – sama dengan produk dari nilai kesaksian (kecil tak terhingga) dan nilai kebahagiaan yang mereka janjikan (yang signifikan tapi terbatas) – harus tentu sangat kecil.[17]

Kegagalan untuk membuktikan keberadaan Tuhan[sunting | sunting sumber]

Voltaire (penulis Pencerahan Prancis terkemuka lainnya), satu generasi setelah Pascal, menolak gagasan bahwa taruhan adalah "bukti Tuhan" sebagai "tidak senonoh dan kekanak-kanakan", menambahkan, "minat saya harus percaya sesuatu bukanlah bukti bahwa hal seperti itu ada".[18] Pascal, bagaimanapun, tidak memajukan taruhan sebagai bukti keberadaan Tuhan melainkan sebagai keputusan pragmatis yang diperlukan yang "mustahil untuk dihindari" bagi setiap orang yang hidup.[19] Dia berargumen bahwa berpantang dari membuat taruhan bukanlah pilihan dan bahwa "alasan tidak mampu" dan bahwa "akal tidak mampu meramalkan kebenaran"; dengan demikian, keputusan apakah akan percaya pada keberadaan Tuhan harus dibuat dengan "mempertimbangkan konsekuensi dari setiap kemungkinan".

Kritik Voltaire bukan menyangkut sifat taruhan Pascalian sebagai bukti keberadaan Tuhan, tetapi anggapan bahwa keyakinan yang coba dipromosikan Pascal tidak meyakinkan. Voltaire mengisyaratkan fakta bahwa Pascal, sebagai Jansenist, percaya bahwa hanya sebagian kecil, dan sudah ditakdirkan, umat manusia pada akhirnya akan diselamatkan oleh Tuhan.

Voltaire menjelaskan bahwa tidak peduli seberapa jauh seseorang tergoda dengan imbalan untuk percaya pada keselamatan Kristen, hasilnya adalah kepercayaan yang lemah.[20] Pascal, dalam *Pensées*-nya, setuju dengan ini, tidak menyatakan bahwa orang dapat memilih untuk percaya (dan karena itu membuat taruhan yang aman), melainkan bahwa beberapa orang tidak dapat percaya.

Seperti yang dijelaskan tienne Souriau, untuk menerima argumen Pascal, petaruh perlu yakin bahwa Tuhan sungguh-sungguh bermaksud untuk menghormati taruhan; dia mengatakan bahwa taruhan mengasumsikan bahwa Tuhan juga menerima taruhan, yang tidak terbukti; Petaruh Pascal di sini seperti orang bodoh yang melihat sehelai daun mengambang di air sungai dan bergetar di beberapa titik, selama beberapa detik, di antara kedua sisi batu, berkata: "Saya bertaruh satu juta dengan Rothschild bahwa akhirnya dibutuhkan kiri jalur." Dan, secara efektif, daun itu lewat di sisi kiri batu, tetapi sayangnya untuk si bodoh Rothschild tidak pernah berkata "Saya [akan menerima] taruhan itu".[21]

Argumen dari wahyu yang tidak konsisten[sunting | sunting sumber]

Artikel utama: Argumen dari wahyu yang tidak konsisten

Karena ada banyak agama sepanjang sejarah, dan oleh karena itu banyak konsepsi tentang Tuhan (atau dewa-dewa), beberapa menyatakan bahwa semuanya perlu diperhitungkan dalam taruhan, dalam sebuah argumentasi yang dikenal sebagai argumen dari wahyu yang tidak konsisten. Ini, para pendukungnya berpendapat, akan mengarah pada kemungkinan besar untuk percaya pada "dewa yang salah", yang, menurut mereka, menghilangkan keuntungan matematis yang diklaim Pascal dengan taruhannya.[4] Denis Diderot, sezaman dengan Voltaire, dengan singkat menyatakan pendapat ini ketika ditanya tentang taruhan, dengan mengatakan "seorang Imam bisa menalar dengan cara yang sama". J. L. Mackie mencatat bahwa "gereja di mana satu-satunya keselamatan dapat ditemukan belum tentu Gereja Roma, tetapi mungkin gereja Anabaptis atau Mormon atau Muslim Sunni atau penyembah Kali atau Odin".[23] Sebagai baru saja dinyatakan, argumen tandingannya cacat, karena sebagian besar agama tidak menyatakan bahwa kepercayaan pada dewa tertentu mereka (Kali atau Odin, misalnya) diperlukan untuk kebahagiaan, tetapi cacat itu mudah diperbaiki dengan menggunakan agama yang sesuai (Anabaptis vs. Katolik Roma).

Versi lain dari keberatan ini berpendapat bahwa untuk setiap agama yang mengumumkan aturan, ada agama lain yang memiliki aturan yang berlawanan, misalnya, Kristen mengharuskan pemeluknya untuk menyembah Yesus sebagai Tuhan, tetapi Yudaisme mengharuskan pemeluknya untuk tidak menyembah Yesus sebagai Tuhan. Jika tindakan tertentu membawa seseorang lebih dekat ke keselamatan dalam agama sebelumnya, itu membawa seseorang lebih jauh darinya di agama yang terakhir. Oleh karena itu, nilai yang diharapkan dari mengikuti agama tertentu bisa menjadi negatif. Atau, orang juga dapat berargumen bahwa ada jumlah tak terbatas dari agama-agama yang saling eksklusif (yang merupakan bagian dari himpunan semua agama yang mungkin), dan bahwa kemungkinan salah satu dari mereka benar adalah nol; oleh karena itu, nilai yang diharapkan dari mengikuti agama tertentu adalah nol.

Pascal mempertimbangkan jenis keberatan ini secara singkat dalam catatan yang dikompilasi ke dalam *Pensées*, dan menolaknya sebagai jelas salah dan tidak jujur:[24]

Apa yang dikatakan [orang-orang kafir] kemudian? "Apakah kita tidak melihat," kata mereka, "bahwa orang-orang biadab hidup dan mati seperti laki-laki, dan orang Turki seperti orang Kristen? Mereka memiliki upacara mereka, nabi mereka, dokter mereka, orang suci mereka, biarawan mereka, seperti kita," dll. Jika Anda peduli tetapi sedikit untuk mengetahui kebenaran, itu sudah cukup untuk membuat Anda tenang. Tetapi jika Anda berhasrat dengan sepenuh hati untuk mengetahuinya, itu tidak cukup; melihatnya secara detail. Itu akan cukup untuk sebuah pertanyaan dalam filsafat; tapi tidak di sini, di mana semuanya dipertaruhkan. Namun, setelah

bent on knowing the truth, they would be persuaded to examine "in detail" whether Christianity is like any other religion, but they just cannot be bothered.^[26] Their objection might be sufficient were the subject concerned merely some "question in philosophy", but not "here, where everything is at stake". In "a matter where they themselves, their eternity, their all are concerned",^[25] they can manage no better than "a superficial reflection" ("une réflexion légère") and, thinking they have scored a point by asking a [leading question](#), they go off to amuse themselves.^[27]

As Pascal scholars observe, Pascal regarded the many-religions objection as a rhetorical ploy, a "trap"^[28] that he had no intention of falling into. If, however, any who raised it were sincere, they would want to examine the matter "in detail". In that case, they could get some pointers by turning to his chapter on "other religions".

David Wetsel notes that Pascal's treatment of the pagan religions is brisk: "As far as Pascal is concerned, the demise of the pagan religions of antiquity speaks for itself. Those pagan religions which still exist in the New World, in [India](#), and in [Africa](#) are not even worth a second glance. They are obviously the work of superstition and ignorance and have nothing in them which might interest 'les gens habiles' ('clever men')^[29],^[30] Islam warrants more attention, being distinguished from paganism (which for Pascal presumably includes all the other non-Christian religions) by its claim to be a revealed religion. Nevertheless, Pascal concludes that the religion founded by Mohammed can on several counts be shown to be devoid of divine authority, and that therefore, as a path to the knowledge of God, it is as much a dead end as paganism."^[31] Judaism, in view of its close links to Christianity, he deals with elsewhere.^[32]

The many-religions objection is taken more seriously by some later [apologists](#) of the wager, who argue that of the rival options only those awarding infinite happiness affect the wager's [dominance](#). In the opinion of these apologists "finite, semi-blissful promises such as Kali's or Odin's" therefore drop out of consideration.^[5] Also, the infinite bliss that the rival conception of God offers has to be mutually exclusive. If Christ's promise of bliss can be attained concurrently with [Jehovah's](#) and [Allah's](#) (all three being identified as the [God of Abraham](#)), there is no conflict in the decision matrix in the case where the cost of believing in the wrong conception of God is neutral (limbo/purgatory/spiritual death), although this would be countered with an infinite cost in the case where not believing in the correct conception of God results in punishment (hell).^[33]

[Ecumenical](#) interpretations of the wager^[34] argues that it could even be suggested that believing in a generic God, or a god by the wrong name, is acceptable so long as that conception of God has similar essential characteristics of the conception of God considered in Pascal's wager (perhaps the [God of Aristotle](#)). Proponents of this line of reasoning suggest that either all of the conceptions of God or gods throughout history truly boil down to just a small set of "genuine options", or that if Pascal's wager can simply bring a person to believe in "generic theism", it has done its job.^[33] The wager fails as an argument for believing exclusively in ecumenical religions, or believing at all in [universalist](#) religions that do not believe only their adherents attain eternal bliss.^[citation needed]

Pascal argues implicitly for the uniqueness of Christianity in the wager itself, writing: "If there is a God, He is infinitely incomprehensible...Who then can blame the Christians for not being able to give reasons for their beliefs, professing as they do a religion which they cannot explain by reason?"^[35]

Argument from inauthentic belief[\[edit\]](#)

Some critics argue that Pascal's wager, for those who cannot believe, suggests feigning belief to gain eternal reward. [Richard Dawkins](#) argues that this would be dishonest and immoral and that, in addition to this, it is absurd to think that God, being just and omniscient, would not see through this deceptive strategy on the part of the "believer", thus nullifying the benefits of the wager.^[16]

Since these criticisms are concerned not with the validity of the wager itself, but with its possible aftermath—namely that a person who has been convinced of the overwhelming odds in favor of belief might still find himself unable to sincerely believe—they are tangential to the thrust of the wager. What such critics are objecting to is Pascal's subsequent advice to an unbeliever who, having concluded that the only rational way to wager is in favor of God's existence, points out, reasonably enough, that this by no means makes him a believer. This hypothetical unbeliever complains, "I am so made that I cannot believe. What would you have me do?"^[36] Pascal, far from suggesting that God can be deceived by outward show, says that God does not regard it at all: "God looks only at what is inward."^[37] For a person who is already convinced of the odds of the wager but cannot seem to put his heart into the belief, he offers practical advice.

Explicitly addressing the question of inability to believe, Pascal argues that if the wager is valid, the inability to believe is irrational, and therefore must be caused by feelings: "your inability to believe, because reason compels you to [believe] and yet you cannot, [comes] from your passions." This inability, therefore, can be overcome by diminishing these irrational sentiments: "Learn from those who were bound like you. . . . Follow the way by which they began; by acting as if they believed, taking the holy water, having masses said, etc. Even this will naturally make you believe, and deaden your acuteness.—But this is what I am afraid of.—And why? What have you to lose?"^[38]

An uncontroversial doctrine in both Roman Catholic and Protestant theology is

refleksi dangkal semacam ini, kita pergi untuk menghibur diri kita sendiri, dll. Mari kita menanyakan agama yang sama ini apakah itu tidak memberikan alasan untuk ketidakjelasan ini; mungkin itu akan mengajarkannya kepada kita.^[25]

Bagian pendek tapi padat ini, yang menyinggung banyak tema yang dibahas di tempat lain di Pensées, telah memunculkan banyak halaman analisis ilmiah.

Pascal mengatakan bahwa skeptisisme orang-orang kafir yang puas dengan keberatan banyak agama telah merayu mereka ke dalam "istirahat" yang fatal. Jika mereka benar-benar bertekad untuk mengetahui kebenaran, mereka akan dibujuk untuk memeriksa "secara rinci" apakah Kekristenan seperti agama lain, tetapi mereka tidak dapat diganggu. Keberatan mereka mungkin cukup jika subjek yang bersangkutan hanya beberapa "pertanyaan dalam filsafat", tetapi tidak "di sini, di mana segala sesuatu dipertaruhkan". Dalam "masalah di mana mereka sendiri, keabadian mereka, semua yang mereka pedulikan",^[25] mereka tidak dapat mengaturnya tidak lebih baik dari "refleksi dangkal" ("une réflexion légère") dan, berpikir mereka telah mencetak poin dengan mengajukan pertanyaan terkemuka, mereka pergi untuk menghibur diri mereka sendiri.

Seperti yang diamati oleh para sarjana Pascal, Pascal menganggap keberatan banyak agama sebagai taktik retorik, sebuah "perangkap"^[28] yang tidak ingin ia jatuhkan. Namun, jika ada yang mengangkatnya dengan tulus, mereka ingin memeriksa masalah itu "secara rinci". Dalam hal ini, mereka bisa mendapatkan beberapa petunjuk dengan membuka bab tentang "agama lain".

David Wetsel mencatat bahwa perlakuan Pascal terhadap agama-agama pagan sangat cepat: "Sejauh menyangkut Pascal, kematian agama-agama pagan kuno berbicara untuk dirinya sendiri. Agama-agama pagan yang masih ada di Dunia Baru, di India, dan di Afrika bahkan tidak layak untuk dilihat sekilas. Mereka jelas merupakan karya takhayul dan ketidaktahuan dan tidak memiliki apa pun di dalamnya yang mungkin menarik 'les gens habiles' ('orang pintar')^[29]".^[30] Islam membutuhkan lebih banyak perhatian, dibedakan dari paganisme (yang bagi Pascal mungkin mencakup semua agama non-Kristen lainnya) dengan klaimnya sebagai agama wahyu. Namun demikian, Pascal menyimpulkan bahwa agama yang didirikan oleh Muhammad dalam beberapa hal dapat terbukti tanpa otoritas ilahi, dan oleh karena itu, sebagai jalan menuju pengetahuan tentang Tuhan, itu adalah jalan buntu seperti paganisme."^[31] Yudaisme, mengingat hubungannya yang erat dengan Kekristenan, ia membahasnya di tempat lain.^[32]

Keberatan banyak agama ditanggapi lebih serius oleh beberapa pembela taruhan kemudian, yang berpendapat bahwa dari opsi saingan hanya mereka yang memberikan kebahagiaan tak terbatas yang mempengaruhi dominasi taruhan. Oleh karena itu, menurut pendapat para pembela ini, "janji-janji semi-bahagia yang terbatas seperti Kali atau Odin" tidak dipertimbangkan lagi.^[5] Juga, kebahagiaan tak terbatas yang ditawarkan konsepsi saingan tentang Tuhan harus saling eksklusif. Jika janji kebahagiaan Kristus dapat dicapai secara bersamaan dengan janji Yahweh dan Allah (ketiganya diidentifikasi sebagai Tuhannya Abraham), tidak ada konflik dalam matriks keputusan dalam kasus di mana biaya mempercayai konsepsi Tuhan yang salah adalah neutral (limbo/api penyucian/kematian spiritual), meskipun ini akan dilawan dengan biaya yang tak terbatas dalam kasus di mana tidak percaya pada konsepsi Tuhan yang benar menghasilkan hukuman (neraka).^[33]

Interpretasi ekumenis dari taruhan^[34] berpendapat bahwa bahkan dapat disarankan bahwa percaya pada Tuhan generik, atau tuhan dengan nama yang salah, dapat diterima selama konsepsi Tuhan memiliki karakteristik esensial yang sama dari konsepsi Tuhan yang dipertimbangkan dalam Taruhan Pascal (mungkin Dewa Aristoteles). Pendukung garis penalaran ini menyarankan bahwa baik semua konsepsi tentang Tuhan atau dewa-dewa sepanjang sejarah benar-benar bermuara pada hanya satu set kecil "pilihan asli", atau bahwa jika taruhan Pascal hanya dapat membawa seseorang untuk percaya pada "teisme generik" , ia telah melakukan tugasnya.^[33] Taruhan gagal sebagai argumen untuk percaya secara eksklusif pada agama ekumenis, atau percaya sama sekali pada agama universalis yang tidak percaya hanya penganutnya yang mencapai kebahagiaan abadi.

Pascal secara implisit berargumentasi tentang keunikan Kekristenan dalam taruhan itu sendiri, dengan menulis: "Jika ada Tuhan, Dia sangat tidak dapat dipahami... Lalu siapa yang dapat menyalahkan orang Kristen karena tidak dapat memberikan alasan untuk keyakinan mereka, mengaku seperti yang mereka lakukan? agama yang tidak dapat mereka jelaskan dengan akal?"^[35]

Argumen dari kepercayaan yang tidak autentik^[sunting | sunting sumber]

Beberapa kritikus berpendapat bahwa taruhan Pascal, bagi mereka yang tidak percaya, menyarankan pura-pura percaya untuk mendapatkan hadiah abadi. Richard Dawkins berpendapat bahwa ini akan menjadi tidak jujur dan tidak bermoral dan bahwa, selain itu, tidak masuk akal untuk berpikir bahwa Tuhan, yang adil dan mahatahu, tidak akan melihat melalui strategi menipu ini dari pihak "orang percaya", sehingga meniadakan manfaat taruhan.^[16]

Karena kritik-kritik ini tidak berkaitan dengan validitas taruhan itu sendiri, tetapi dengan kemungkinan akibatnya—yaitu bahwa seseorang yang telah diyakinkan akan kemungkinan besar yang mendukung kepercayaan mungkin masih menemukan dirinya tidak dapat dengan tulus percaya—mereka bersinggungan dengan dorongan taruhan. Apa yang ditentang oleh para kritikus tersebut adalah nasihat Pascal selanjutnya kepada orang yang tidak percaya yang, setelah menyimpulkan bahwa satu-satunya cara rasional untuk bertaruh adalah mendukung keberadaan Tuhan, menunjukkan, cukup masuk akal, bahwa ini sama sekali tidak membuatnya menjadi orang percaya. Orang tidak percaya hipotesis ini mengeluh, "Saya dibuat sedemikian rupa sehingga saya tidak dapat percaya. Apa yang Anda ingin saya lakukan?"^[36] Pascal, jauh dari menyarankan bahwa Tuhan dapat ditipu oleh penampilan luar, mengatakan bahwa Tuhan tidak menganggapnya sama sekali: "Tuhan hanya melihat apa yang ada di dalam."^[37] Untuk seseorang yang sudah

that mere belief in God is insufficient to attain salvation, the standard cite being [James 2:19](#): "Thou believest that there is one God; thou doest well: the devils also believe, and tremble." Salvation requires "faith" not just in the sense of belief, but of trust and obedience. Pascal and [his sister](#), a nun, were among the leaders of Roman Catholicism's [Jansenist school of thought](#) whose doctrine of salvation was close to Protestantism in emphasizing faith over works. Both Jansenists and Protestants followed [St. Augustine](#) in this emphasis (Martin Luther belonged to the [Augustinian Order](#) of monks). Augustine wrote

So our faith has to be distinguished from the faith of the demons. Our faith, you see, purifies the heart, their faith makes them guilty. They act wickedly, and so they say to the Lord, "What have you to do with us?" When you hear the demons saying this, do you imagine they don't recognize him? "We know who you are," they say. "You are the Son of God" (Lk 4:34). Peter says this and he is praised for it; 14 the demon says it, and is condemned. Why's that, if not because the words may be the same, but the heart is very different? So let us distinguish our faith, and see that believing is not enough. That's not the sort of faith that purifies the heart.^[39]

Since Pascal's position was that "saving" belief in God required more than logical assent, accepting the wager could only be a first step. Hence his advice on what steps one could take to arrive at belief.

Some other critics^[40] have objected to Pascal's wager on the grounds that he wrongly assumes what type of epistemic character God would likely value in his rational creatures if he existed.

Variations and other wager arguments[[edit](#)]

- The [sophist Protagoras](#) had an agnostic position regarding the gods, but he nevertheless continued to worship the gods. This could be considered as an early version of the Wager.^[40]
- In the famous tragedy of [Euripides Bacchae](#), [Kadmos](#) states an early version of Pascal's wager. It is noteworthy that at the end of the tragedy [Dionysos](#), the god to whom [Kadmos](#) referred, appears and punishes him for thinking in this way. [Euripides](#), quite clearly, considered and dismissed the wager in this tragedy.^[41]
- The [stoic philosopher](#) and [Roman Emperor Marcus Aurelius](#) expressed a similar sentiment in the second book of [Meditations](#), saying "Since it is possible that thou mayest depart from life this very moment, regulate every act and thought accordingly. But to go away from among men, if there are gods, is not a thing to be afraid of, for the gods will not involve thee in evil; but if indeed they do not exist, or if they have no concern about human affairs, what is it to me to live in a universe devoid of gods or devoid of Providence?"^[42]
- In the [Sanskrit](#) classic [Śārasamuccaya](#), [Vararuci](#) makes a similar argument to Pascal's wager.^[43]
- Muslim [Imam Ja'far al-Sadiq](#) is recorded to have postulated variations of the wager on several occasions in different forms, including his famed 'Tradition of the Myrobalan Fruit'.^[44] In the [Shi'i hadith](#) book [al-Kafi](#), al-Sadiq declares to an atheist "If what you say is correct – and it is not – then we will both succeed. But if what I say is correct – and it is – then I will succeed, and you will be destroyed."^[45]
- An instantiation of this [argument](#), within the Islamic *kalam* tradition, was discussed by [Imam al-Haramayn al-Juwayni](#) (d. 478/1085) in his *Kitab al-irshad ila-qawati al-adilla fi usul al-i'tiqad*, or *A Guide to the Conclusive Proofs for the Principles of Belief*.^[46]
- The Christian apologist [Arnobius of Sicca](#) (d. 330) stated an early version of the argument in his book *Against the Pagans*, arguing "is it not more rational, of two things uncertain and hanging in doubtful suspense, rather to believe that which carries with it some hopes, than that which brings none at all?"^{[47][48]}
- A close parallel just before Pascal's time occurred in the Jesuit [Antoine Sirmond's](#) *On the Immortality of the Soul* (1635), which explicitly compared the choice of religion to playing dice and argued "However long and happy the space of this life may be, while ever you place it in the other pan of the balance against a blessed and flourishing eternity, surely it will seem to you ... that the pan will rise on high."^{[47]:30}
- The [Atheist's Wager](#), popularised by the philosopher [Michael Martin](#) and published in his 1990 book *Atheism: A Philosophical Justification*, is an atheistic wager argument in response to Pascal's wager.^[49]
- A 2008 philosophy book, *How to Make Good Decisions and Be Right All the Time*, presents a secular revision of Pascal's wager: "What does it hurt to pursue value and virtue? If there is value, then we have everything to gain, but if there is none, then we haven't lost anything.... Thus, we should seek value."^[50]
- [Roko's basilisk](#) is a hypothetical future [superintelligence](#) that punishes everyone who failed to help bring it into existence.^[51]
- In a 2014 article, philosopher Justin P. McBrayer argued we ought to remain agnostic about the existence of God but nonetheless

yakin akan peluang taruhan tetapi tampaknya tidak bisa menaruh hatinya pada keyakinan, ia menawarkan nasihat praktis.

Secara eksplisit menjawab pertanyaan tentang ketidakmampuan untuk percaya, Pascal berpendapat bahwa jika taruhannya valid, ketidakmampuan untuk percaya adalah irasional, dan oleh karena itu harus disebabkan oleh perasaan: "ketidakmampuan Anda untuk percaya, karena alasan memaksa Anda untuk [percaya] namun Anda tidak bisa, [berasal] dari nafsumu." Ketidakmampuan ini, oleh karena itu, dapat diatasi dengan mengurangi sentimen irasional ini: "Belajarlah dari mereka yang terikat seperti Anda... Ikuti cara mereka memulai; dengan bertindak seolah-olah mereka percaya, mengambil air suci, meminta massa mengatakan, dll. Bahkan ini secara alami akan membuat Anda percaya, dan memamatkan ketajaman Anda.—Tapi inilah yang saya takutkan.—Dan mengapa? Apa ruginya?"^[38]

Doktrin yang tidak kontroversial dalam teologi Katolik Roma dan Protestan adalah bahwa hanya percaya pada Tuhan tidak cukup untuk mencapai keselamatan, standar mengutip Yakobus 2:19: "Engkau percaya bahwa hanya ada satu Tuhan; engkau melakukannya dengan baik: iblis juga percaya, dan gemetar." Keselamatan membutuhkan "iman" tidak hanya dalam arti kepercayaan, tetapi juga kepercayaan dan ketepatan. Pascal dan saudara perempuannya, seorang biarawati, termasuk di antara para pemimpin aliran pemikiran Jansenis Katolik Roma yang doktrin keselamatannya mirip dengan Protestantisme dalam menekankan iman di atas perbuatan. Baik Jansenis maupun Protestan mengikuti St. Agustinus dalam penekanan ini (Martin Luther termasuk dalam Ordo biarawan Augustinian). Agustinus menulis

Jadi iman kita harus dibedakan dari iman setan. Iman kami, Anda lihat, menyucikan hati, iman mereka membuat mereka bersalah. Mereka bertindak jahat, dan karena itu mereka berkata kepada Tuhan, "Apa urusan-Mu dengan kami?" Ketika Anda mendengar setan mengatakan ini, apakah Anda membayangkan mereka tidak mengenalinya? "Kami tahu siapa Anda," kata mereka. "Engkau adalah Anak Allah" (Luk 4:34). Petrus mengatakan ini dan dia dipuji karenanya; 14 iblis mengatakannya, dan dikutuk. Mengapa demikian, jika bukan karena kata-katanya mungkin sama, tetapi hatinya sangat berbeda? Jadi marilah kita membedakan iman kita, dan melihat bahwa percaya saja tidak cukup. Itu bukanlah jenis iman yang menyucikan hati.^[39]

Karena posisi Pascal adalah bahwa kepercayaan "menyelamatkan" pada Tuhan membutuhkan lebih dari sekadar persetujuan logis, menerima taruhan hanya bisa menjadi langkah pertama. Oleh karena itu nasihatnya tentang langkah-langkah apa yang dapat diambil seseorang untuk sampai pada keyakinan.

Beberapa kritikus lain[siapa?] telah keberatan dengan taruhan Pascal dengan alasan bahwa dia salah mengasumsikan jenis karakter epistemik apa yang kemungkinan akan dihargai Tuhan dalam makhluk rasionalnya jika dia ada.

Variasi dan argumen taruhan lainnya[sunting | sunting sumber]

- Protagoras yang sofis memiliki posisi agnostik tentang dewa-dewa, tetapi ia tetap memuja dewa-dewa. Ini dapat dianggap sebagai versi awal dari Taruhan.^[40]
- Dalam tragedi terkenal Euripides Bacchae, Kadmos menyatakan versi awal dari taruhan Pascal. Patut dicatat bahwa di akhir tragedi Dionysos, dewa yang dirujuk Kadmos, muncul dan menghukumnya karena berpikir seperti itu. Euripides, cukup jelas, mempertimbangkan dan menolak taruhan dalam tragedi ini.^[41]
- Filsuf tabah dan Kaisar Romawi Marcus Aurelius mengungkapkan sentimen serupa dalam buku kedua Meditasi, dengan mengatakan "Karena mungkin saja Anda meninggalkan kehidupan saat ini juga, aturlah setiap tindakan dan pemikiran sesuai dengan itu. Tetapi untuk menjauh dari antara manusia, jika ada dewa, bukanlah hal yang perlu ditakuti, karena para dewa tidak akan melibatkanmu dalam kejahatan; tetapi jika memang mereka tidak ada, atau jika mereka tidak peduli dengan urusan manusia, apa gunanya aku hidup? di alam semesta tanpa dewa atau tanpa Tuhan?"^[42]
- Dalam Śārasamuccaya klasik Sanskerta, Vararuci membuat argumen yang mirip dengan taruhan Pascal.^[43]
- Imam Muslim Ja'far al-Sadiq tercatat telah mendalilkan variasi taruhan pada beberapa kesempatan dalam bentuk yang berbeda, termasuk 'Tradisi Buah Myrobalan' yang terkenal.^[44] Dalam buku hadits Syi'ah al-Kafi, al-Sadiq menyatakan kepada seorang ateis "Jika apa yang Anda katakan benar - dan tidak - maka kita berdua akan berhasil. Tetapi jika apa yang saya katakan benar - dan memang benar - maka saya akan berhasil, dan Anda akan dihancurkan." ^[45]
- Instansiasi argumen ini, dalam tradisi kalam Islam, dibahas oleh Imam al-Haramayn al-Juwayni (w. 478/1085) dalam Kitab al-irshad ila-qawati al-adilla fi usul al-i'tiqad, atau Panduan untuk Bukti Konklusif untuk Prinsip-Prinsip Keyakinan.^[46]
- Pembela Kristen Arnobius dari Sicca (w. 330) menyatakan versi awal argumen dalam bukunya *Against the Pagans*, dengan alasan "bukankah lebih rasional, dari dua hal yang tidak pasti dan tergantung dalam ketegangan yang meragukan, daripada mempercayai apa yang membawa dengan itu beberapa harapan, daripada yang tidak membawa sama sekali?"^{[47][48]}
- Sebuah paralel yang dekat sebelum waktu Pascal terjadi dalam *On the Immortality of the Soul* (1635) karya Jesuit Antoine Sirmond, yang secara eksplisit membandingkan pilihan agama dengan bermain dadu dan berargumen "Seberapa lama dan bahagiannya ruang kehidupan ini, sementara pernah Anda menempatkannya di panci lain dari keseimbangan melawan keabadian yang diberkati dan berkembang, pasti akan tampak bagi Anda ... bahwa panci akan naik tinggi."^{[47]:30}
- The Atheist's Wager, dipopulerkan oleh filsuf Michael Martin dan diterbitkan dalam bukunya tahun 1990 *Atheism: A Philosophical Justification*, adalah argumen

believe because of the good that comes in the present life from believing in God. "The gist of the renewed wager is that theists do better than non-theists regardless of whether or not God exists."^[52]

Climate change^[edit]

Since at least 1992, some scholars have analogized Pascal's wager to decisions about catastrophic climate change.^[53] Two differences from Pascal's wager are posited regarding climate change: first, climate change is more likely than Pascal's God to exist, as there is scientific evidence for one but not the other.^[54] Secondly, the calculated penalty for unchecked climate catastrophe would be large, but is not generally considered to be infinite.^[55] Magnate [Warren Buffett](#) has written that climate change "bears a similarity to Pascal's Wager on the Existence of God. Pascal, it may be recalled, argued that if there were only a tiny probability that God truly existed, it made sense to behave as if He did because the rewards could be infinite whereas the lack of belief risked eternal misery. Likewise, if there is only a 1% chance the planet is heading toward a truly major disaster and delay means passing a point of no return, inaction now is foolhardy."^{[56][57]}

See also^[edit]

taruhan ateistik dalam menanggapi taruhan Pascal.[49]

- Sebuah buku filosofi tahun 2008, Bagaimana Membuat Keputusan yang Baik dan Menjadi Benar Sepanjang Waktu, menyajikan revisi sekuler dari taruhan Pascal: "Apa salahnya mengejar nilai dan kebajikan? Jika ada nilai, maka kita memiliki segalanya untuk mendapatkan, tetapi jika tidak ada, maka kita tidak kehilangan apa pun.... Jadi, kita harus mencari nilai."^[50]

- Basilisk Roko adalah superintelligen hipotetis masa depan yang menghukum setiap orang yang gagal membantu mewujudkannya.^[51]

- Dalam sebuah artikel tahun 2014, filsuf Justin P. McBrayer berpendapat bahwa kita harus tetap agnostik tentang keberadaan Tuhan tetapi tetap percaya karena kebaikan yang datang dalam kehidupan saat ini dari percaya kepada Tuhan. "Inti dari taruhan yang diperbarui adalah bahwa kaum teis melakukan lebih baik daripada non-teis terlepas dari apakah Tuhan itu ada atau tidak."^[52]

Perubahan iklim^[sunting | sunting sumber]

Setidaknya sejak tahun 1992, beberapa ahli telah menganalogikan taruhan Pascal dengan keputusan tentang bencana perubahan iklim.^[53] Ada dua perbedaan dari taruhan Pascal mengenai perubahan iklim: pertama, perubahan iklim lebih mungkin daripada Tuhan Pascal, karena ada bukti ilmiah untuk yang satu tapi tidak untuk yang lain.^[54] Kedua, hukuman yang diperhitungkan untuk bencana iklim yang tidak terkendali akan besar, tetapi umumnya tidak dianggap tidak terbatas.^[55] Magnate Warren Buffett telah menulis bahwa perubahan iklim "memiliki kesamaan dengan Taruhan Pascal tentang Keberadaan Tuhan. Pascal, dapat diingat, berpendapat bahwa jika hanya ada kemungkinan kecil bahwa Tuhan benar-benar ada, masuk akal untuk berperilaku seolah-olah Dia lakukan karena imbalannya bisa tak terbatas sedangkan kurangnya kepercayaan mempertaruhkan kesengsaraan abadi. Demikian juga, jika hanya ada 1% kemungkinan planet ini menuju bencana yang benar-benar besar dan penundaan berarti melewati titik tanpa tujuan, tidak bertindak sekarang adalah tindakan yang bodoh."^{[56][57]}

Lihat juga aslinya]